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PREFACE
My acquaintance with the thought of David Hume began five
years ago. As a philosophy student, it was inevitable that I would
learn of him. Hume's influence on the history of philosophy is of
such a significance that philosophical history would be incomplete
without him. The challenges that Hume presented excited my
intellectual curiosities. I was never the same again. After reading
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding I was convinced that
my attitude and manner towards religious beliefs had to change. The
result was a critical and deep struggle that almost took me to the
"wild cavils and imaginations" of agnosticism and extreme liberalism.
But that was the past. By keeping my heart warm as a I grappled
with my mind, I emerged from the slough, a person renewed by
grace. It has become a principle of mine that faith exists in the
context of tension. The reality of faith cannot be realized in the soft
cushions of fideism nor in the luxuries of indifference. Faith must be
continually challenged and questioned that it may attain maturity of
belief. This is my debt to the Scottish gentleman. The rigors of
graduate study have afforded me the opportunity to study Hume.
And so here it is: the product of an attempt to face the man again
after so many years. It is my hope that through this paper, the
readers might be brought into the tension that revives true belief.
And that in the throngs of such challenges, a growing process will
take place in the light of deeper grace.
I would like to take the opportunity to thank the following
persons for their invaluable contribution to this work.
To Rich and Rachel Burlingame thanks for being my computer
consultants. Without you this paper could not have been put
together (literally).
To Dave Baggett and Mark Cross thanks for letting me use your
computers and for putting up with my invasions of your privacy.
To Jani Grismer thanks for giving me your copy of the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. Your notations in the book were a
source of insights.
To my roommate Keith Winslow thanks for your encouragement.
It has been a source of strength.
To my parents and family thanks for reminding me to make sure
I get this paper done because I could do it.
To Dr. Jerry Walls thanks for your direction and guidance. The
section on the problem of evil is dedicated to you.
To the seminary thank you for the opportunity you have given me
to indulge in this project.
And thank you Lord for your faithful presence throughout this
ordeal. You have kept my heart warm and my mind true. May this
work give glory to your name. Amen.
Chapter One
Introduction
David Hume, the most significant British philosopher of the past
three centuries, was born on April 26, 1711 at Edinburgh, Scotland.
He belonged to a moderately affluent family of landed gentry and
spent most of his early years at the family estate in Ninewells. At
twelve, Hume entered Edinburgh University with the intention of
studying law. But his passion was for literature and philosophy.
Thus it was inevitable that he pursued the career of a prolific writer
with strong literary ambitions. After working as a clerk in Bristol, he
moved to France in 1734 determined to launch his career. The result
was the Treatise on Human Nature completed in 1737 and published
in 1739. Hume felt that this work was a failure because it did not
receive critical acclaim among the thinkers of that day. Among them
were Bishop Berkeley, Bishop Butler, and Francis Hutcheson whose
opinions Hume respected.
From 1739 to 1745 Hume resided quietly at Ninewells writing the
third volume to his Treatise. This work was a conglomeration of
various essays on morals, philosophy, and politics in which he
attempted to reach a wider audience. ^ The third volume finally
aroused the attention of much of Scotland and Hume began to
emerge as a controversial popular figure. The rise of Hume's
controversy-laden reputation became evident in 1745 when
Edinburgh denied his application for the chair of Ethics and
Pneumatical Philosophy. As a result Hume accompanied General St.
1 Hume on Religion (Cleveland: Meridian, 1964), p.7
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Clair to Brittany, Vienna, and Turin serving as the general's secretary
from 1746 to 1748. By 1748 upon fulfilling his secretarial duties
Hume had already finished his Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding that was published that same year. Three years later
he published the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In
1751 Hume was in Edinburgh having been appointed Librarian to the
Faculty of Advocates. By this time his literary endeavors shifted to
historical concerns. His History of England was published by
installments in 1754, 1756, 1759, and 1762. This work continued to
fuel the controversy that became the hallmark of Hume's rising
reputation. From 1763 to 1766 Hume was in Paris serving in the
Embassy while cavorting with French "philosophes" and hostesses in
the "salons". ^ These years in France made Hume an ardent admirer
of French society. In 1766 he returned to England with Rousseau.
The two became famous friends but later parted as bitter opponents.
After serving as Under Secretary of State in London, Hume retired to
Edinburgh in 1769. In 1775 he became fatally afflicted with a
cancer of the bowels. He died the next year in August 25, 1776.
During his lifetime Hume's fame was that of a controversial
literary figure. But his posterity to the succeeding generations was
that of a significant philosopher whose thinking has stimulated
philosophical thought to this day. The study of Hume's influence on
philosophy requires a separate work. His influence extends to
thinkers and schools of thought representative of great intellectual
movements from the 18th to the 20th centuries. Immanuel Kant
2 Ibid.
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from the critical-rational standpoint admits it was Hume who
awakened his critical spirit. Thomas Reid and W. Hamilton
represented the Scottish empiricists who were indebted to Hume. 3
J.S. Mill and A. Bain as epistemological associationalists and moral
utilitarians take their cues from Hume. Even T.H. Green's idealism
cannot rid itself of Hume's influence. 5 And finally the more recent
physiological psychology of Wundt and W. James rests upon
assumptions that are recognizably the fruition of Hume's
implications. ^
Hume's main contribution to philosophy is without any doubt in
the fields of epistemology and moral philosophy. Much of past and
recent works on Hume's thought have concentrated on his theories of
knowledge and his discussions of morals. Unfortunately there is less
recognition of the fact that Hume has very significant points to make
about religion as subject to philosophical thought. Hume's two full
pieces on religion appeared late in his life and after his death. The
Natural History of Religion was published in 1757 and his Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion appeared posthumously in 1779. It is
encouraging to note that recent philosophical studies have
concentrated upon Hume's views on religion. The maturing field of
^ James Orr, David Hume and his Influence on Philosophy and Theology (New
York: Scribner, 1903), p.viii.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Hume, p.9.
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philosophy of religion now admits to the fact that Hume's philosophy
of religion is as significant as his epistemology and moral
philosophy. Articles are now being published involving extensive
discussions of Hume's essay On Miracles, or his criticisms of the
design argument, as well as his views on evil and theodicy. It is now
becoming increasingly clear that Hume has written a great deal about
religion. The evidence from his personal and apologetic
correspondence shows that Hume's interest in religion preceded the
Treatise, his first published work. Writing a letter in 1751, he
remarks:
Tis not long ago that I burn'd an old manuscript book, wrote
before I was twenty.... it begun with an anxious search after
arguments to confirm the common opinion. Doubts stole in,
dissipated, return'd, were again dissipated, return'd again; and it
was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against
inclination perhaps against reason. 8
It is quite interesting to note that his "Early Memoranda" notes
and paraphrases reveal a deep interest in religion. 9 it is now known
that his Treatise, though not directly concerned with religion,
originally had sections on miracles and other religious subjects,
Hume deliberately edited them out of the book to avoid hostility
from the Scottish ecclesiastics. This is such an irony since it was this
sort of hostility that later catapulted his literary reputation. But
8 J.C.A. Gaskin, Hume's Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1978), p.l.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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modern philosophy can no longer deny Hume's equally influential
contributions to the field of philosophy of religion.
Problem
The approach then to the study of Hume's philosophy in this work
has certain functioning assumptions. An assumption is that Hume's
philosophy, whether it be dealing with his theory of knowledge or
his political philosophy, is all interconnected and interrelated. What
Hume believed and reasoned in epistemology has underlying
repercussions in his thoughts on morals or economy. And his moral
philosophy relates deeply to his political philosophy. Thus the
corollary assumption follows that the study of Hume's thoughts in
one field sheds light upon his views on another. So that in exploring
Hume's philosophy of religion one may be able to apprehend the
workings of Hume's epistemology. (Although this is not the only
implication of interconnectedness.) With these sort of assumptions,
this work presupposes that Hume's philosophy of religion reflects
features of Hume's theory of knowledge. The Dialogues is by far
Hume's masterpiece in the field of philosophy of religion. This work
will attempt to trace his epistemology in his thoughts on religion as
they are presented in this book. The fundamental problem of this
thesis is expressed in the question:
How does the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion show the
synthesis of David Hume's theory of knowledge?
The crux of the issue is explorative. The attempt is to discover the
synthesis of Hume's epistemology in his philosophy of religion. The
locus of the entire operation will center upon the Dialogues. The
importance of the study lies in the fact that the appreciation of Hume
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as a philosopher is multi-dimensional. The coherence in which
human thought operates in various areas of concentration promotes
security from anomie and confusion. Appreciating Hume as a
theorist of knowledge must involve putting this theory into action.
The exploration of his philosophy of religion can reveal the intricate
operation of Hume's epistemology when it deals with subjects such as
deity and the supernatural. Immersion into Hume's world of
religious thinking provides unique insights into his conception of
knowledge and understanding. The limits of this study will be
generally within the confines of philosophy. More specifically, since
this work will concentrate on the synthesis of Hume's theory of
knowledge in his philosophy of religion, it will deliberately steer
away from other aspects of Hume's thought. The demonstration of
the synthesis of Hume's epistemology in his philosophy of religion
will be strategically presented within the parameters of his
Dialogues.
Perspective and Terms
Attitudes and intuitions are never absent in the engagement of
explorative research. Somehow anyone who attempts to explore
certain issues brings into the activity certain scenarios and affections
concerning the manner and outcome of the task. Although these are
based on functioning assumptions yet they are distinct from them.
There is already a preset network of expectations and notions at the
outset that will either be enhanced or discarded at the end of the
explorative study. It also from these perspectives that the terms
used in the research get their definition and meaning. This thesis
approaches the exploration of Hume's Dialogues with the perspective
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that the book faithfully presents Hume's philosophy of religion.
Hume's religious thought is of a mature and refined quality in his
Dialogues This work treats Hume's book as a sufficient specimen of
Hume's religious convictions. Consequently, based upon the
previously stated assumptions in the problem section, this
explorative study also hypothesizes that Hume's epistemology will be
demonstrated in the Dialogues. As sufficient specimen of Hume's
philosophy of religion, this book is likely reveals the synthesis of his
theory of knowledge. The word synthesis means the wholistic nature
in which Hume's theory of knowledge operates in his inquiries on
religion. The Dialogues are therefore perceived as the splendid
environment wherein Hume's epistemology as explicated in his
Treatise and his Enquiry can be synthetically pointed out.
Method of Approach
In the following chapters this study will methodically approach
the problem previously stated. The first chapter will concentrate on
Hume's theory of knowledge as it is interpreted from his Treatise
and his Enquiry. The purpose of course is to be adequately
acquainted with Hume's epistemology. The second chapter will
involve a comprehensive focus on Hume's philosophy of religion in
the light of the previous chapter on his epistemology. His views on
religion will be laid out for the purpose of exploring their relation to
his theory of knowledge. The third chapter will deal completely with
Hume's Dialogues. The book will be subjected to explorative study as
a literary work that has vital insights into Hume's epistemology. The
aim is to demonstrate the synthesis of Hume's theory of knowledge
in his philosophy of religion as apparent in his book. The last
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chapter will be the postscript in which the conclusions of this study
will be laid out for closure.
Review of Related Literature
In 1903 James Orr published David Hume and his Influence on
Philosophy and Theology. In this book Orr explores the life and
thinking of Hume as the outcome of an analysis of his life and
writings. He starts with the biography of Hume using Hume's
published works as anchorpoints. He then proceeds to an exposition
of Hume's views on knowledge, causation, and substance. He relates
these themes to Hume's views on morals and theology as well as to
Hume's opinions on politics, economy, and history. Orr's point is that
Hume sought to explain the intellectual and moral outfit of humanity
without the assumption of a rational nature in human persons. This
was Hume's mistake which became evident in his views on theology
and other subjects.
Twelve years later a book entitled Studies in the Philosophy of
David Hume was released from Princeton by Charles W. Hendel Jr. In
this extensive book Hendel goes through in detail the life and times
of Hume from his ambitions to his youthful discoveries and to his
intellectual disputes. He presents Hume's epistemology in dialogue
with Hume's contempormes. The sections range from Hume's theory
of relations, to his views on causation, on the external world, on
personal identity, and on philosophical scepticism. Hendel focuses on
the Dialogues as a gateway into Hume's metaphysical convictions on
theism, naturalism, and scepticism. Hendel is convinced that a
concentrated study of Hume's reflections on the problems of religion
leads to a formation of Humean epistemology and metaphysics.
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J.C.A. Gaskin published his Hume's Philosophy of Religion in 1978.
The book deals primarily with Hume's philosophy of religion in three
major sections. The first is on natural religion, the second is on
revealed religion and natural belief, and the third is on historical and
personal religion. Gaskin pores over Hume's various arguments and
reasonings on design, theodicy, immortality, theology, miracles,
revelation, and religion itself. In this process he consistently returns
to Hume's epistemological and metaphysical doctrines as the basis for
mutual interpretation between Hume's theory of knowledge and
Hume's philosophy of religion. Gaskin shows how Hume's discussions
on religion form a coherent picture despite their diversity.
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Chapter Two
Hume's Theory of Knowledge
The seventeenth and eighteenth century was an active period of
intellectual activity. Rationalism was at its heyday. Spawned
primarily in the continent, reason was considered the norm of every
academic and scholastic endeavor. Philosophical circles were buzzing
with Descartes' rational dualism. Descartes never accepted anything
except clear and distinct ideas as the content of knowledge. ^ He
supposed that the essence of being was thinking. "I think therefore I
am." Thus the mind was eventually distinguished from the body and
all knowledge of external things existed in the mind. In Descartes
the starting point of philosophy is doubt. Thus all claims and
propositions about facts and knowledge were rejected until they
were demonstrated as valid. The method of demonstration was to be
found in rational principles that could secure a system of knowledge.
The result was the primacy of mathematical operations in the
elevation of reason as the sure ground for certainty. It was
inevitable then that Spinoza later pursued Descartes' intimations by
constructing a geometry of philosophy. Spinoza surmised that it was
the nature of the mind to perceive things from a timeless point of
view. 2 The order and connections of ideas is the same as the order
and connections of things. Thus by using mathematics, Spinoza was
able to demonstrate the unity of all divergences of subjects
(metaphysics, morals, etc.) into one substantial reality. Another
1 Richard Osbom, Philosophy for Beginners (New York: Writers, 1991), pp.70-73.
2 Op.cit. p.76
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major figure who followed the tenets of rationalism was Liebniz.
Taking his cue from Spinoza, Liebniz proposed that the one-
substance reality is actually an infinity of infinitesimal simple
substances called "monads". ^ Each monad is different and is not
spatio-temporally accessible. But they are immaterial souls that
mirror the entire universe. Spinoza's monism and Liebnitz's monads
surged that great stream of metaphysical speculation that idolized
reason. This movement did not stay in the European continent.
From France, Spain, and Germany rationalism invaded the British
isles and bred its particular kind of thought. Reason was not only the
master of metaphysical speculation but also the sole basis for
genuine knowledge and understanding. Thus Deism came to the
fore.'^ According to it, there is a religion natural to all human beings
and this religion is discoverable a priori through reason alone. The
discussion of the nature of morals and religion was defined by the
calculations of human reason. The foundations of religion are the
purely natural demonstrations of God's existence and the moral law. 5
It was on the British isles however that a significant rebellion
against rationalism was instigated. This protest was primarily
inspired because of the rationalists' bold criticism and ridicule of
morals and religion that did not subscribe to reason. This
subscription to rationalism is evident in Samuel Clarke's Boyle
3 Op.cit. p.79
4 Uymf. Selections (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966), p.v.
5 James Collins, The British Empiricists (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967), p.42.
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lectures of 1704 and 1705. Clarke posited a series of mathematically
precise demonstrations brilliantly deduced, that validated certainty
about God and his attributes.^ The result of this sort of rationalist
theology was a fully attenuated Deism that went against a lot of
Orthodox convictions. It is no surprise then that the personalities
who attacked the absolutism of reason were persons of strong
religious convictions. Among these famous and powerful protesters
were Bishop Butler, Bishop Berkeley, and John Locke. Locke was
probably the first influential figure to deliver a major reaction
against rationalism. He insisted that the basis for human knowledge
is not reason but experience alone. Locke defied the rationalists
when he asserted that the ideas that constitute our knowledge of the
world, and of things all stem from our experience of the world and of
things. Berkeley pursued this empiricism further by declaring that
empiricism proves the existence of God. If our ideas rise from
experience through our perceptions then the world and things exist
only in our perceptions. Our conviction that the world and things
exist beyond our experience of them can rest only upon the premise
that they exist in the perception and experience of God. "To exist is
to be perceived.
' It is in this milieu of empirical philosophy that
Hume was intensely involved and influenced. Hume was also well
acquainted with anti-rationalism in the European continent through
the influence of Father Malebranche and Rousseau. But it was in this
6 Paul Russel, "Skepticism and natural religion - from footnote 16 in Hume's
Treatise", Innmal of the History of Ideas (vA9. April-June 1988), p.250.
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empiricism that Hume conceived his philosophy which left its mark
in the ages to come.
The TREATISE and the ENQUIRY
Hume's epistemology within the context of the philosophical
streams of the eighteenth century reveals the strategic importance of
his two books. The Humean theory of knowledge is unreservedly
explicated in the Treatise on Human Nature and the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. As significant books on
epistemology written in a highly active intellectual period, the
Treatise and the Enquiry reflect the interaction of the various
philosophical streams. The rebellion against rationalism is quite
evident in the pages of both books. In the Treatise and the Enquiry.
Hume joins Locke and Berkeley in objecting to the primacy of the
rational a priori operation in knowledge and speculation. In fact he
actually completes this empirical onslaught to the hilt. Hume also
joins Rousseau and Voltaire in defying the lofty metaphysical
propositions that have been spurred by Descartes, Spinoza, and
Liebnitz. But at the same time, in the very pages of Hume's books on
epistemology it becomes clear that Hume disagrees with the
romanticist protest. In the Treatise and the Enquiry. Hume objects to
Rousseau's thesis that the heart is superior to reason. (Although his
stand on morals in its dominant affective theme, is not too far from
the romanticist's musings.) Hume does not refute Rousseau. But it is
clear that he does not agree with him.
Moreover, the Treatise and the Enquiry also reflect Hume's
attitude towards his empiricist colleagues. His basic concordance
with Locke and his close affinity with Berkeley (especially in
Managbanag 14
nominalism) is traceable. The sections of Hume's Treatise has
patterns of presentation similar to Locke's Essav Concerning Human
Understanding. Hume's treatment of ideas, perceptions, and other
empirical subjects can be paralled in Locke and Berkeley. But in the
Treatise and the Enquiry Hume's epistemological stance quickly turns
into a basic analysis of the empiricism that he inherits. His sections
on sceptical philosophy as well as his conclusions on externality,
deity, and substance are clear disagreements with the empiricism of
Locke and Berkeley. Hume's empiricism in the Treatise and the
Enquiry intimates a discussion between Hume and his philosophical
environment.
Interestingly enough, Hume's empiricism has its internal
distinctions in his own intellectual development. This becomes
evident in the comparison and contrast between the Treatise
(earlier) and the Enquiry (later). In the Treatise. Hume attempts to
cover a wider spectrum of discussion. In fact the subtitle of the book
is "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral
subjects". The work comprises three volumes: on understanding, on
passions, and on morals. The volume on understanding (Book one) is
the section where Hume lays out explicitly, his epistemological thesis.
The Enquiry on the other hand is devoted solely to the
understanding. Hume's philosophy of morals is discussed in a
separate book: the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Apparently, much of the discussions on the theory of knowledge in
the Treatise appears in the Enquiry. But in the Enquiry, much of the
epistemology which appears in numerous sections of the Treatise is
condensed, edited, and excised. Flew observes that the early
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epistemological investigations in the Treatise become a mature
philosophy in the Enquiry 7 The revolutionary principles scattered
throughout the former, appear in simple, shorter, and more orderly
form in the latter. ^ It is definitely a more mature and daring Hume
that v^rites the later Enquiry. The sections and subjects that Hume
avoided in the earlier Treatise (such as miracles, etc.) appear
explicitly in the Enquiry. Hume's maturity is evident in the nature of
his empiricism detectable in the two books.
In the Treatise. Hume's empiricism is extremely psychological. ^
Ideas which comprise knowledge come from the stronger perceptions
in impressions. The weaker perceptions in ideas are strictly images
of impressions. Such a rigid representationalism led Hume to
implicate the extreme: no impression, no idea. Hume brashly
challenges the notion that an idea can be produced which is not
derived from experience (in impressions). He was quite sure that
evidence from experience and from those defective experientially
(i.e. blind, etc.) supported his view. In the Enquiry however, the
mature Hume edges away from this extreme psychological
empiricism to a logical empiricism. He makes a more distinct
boundary between thinking and experience. The limits of the ranges
7 A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. D.J. 'O Connor (London: Free, 1964),
p.255.
8 Constance Mound, Hume's Theory of Knowledge (New York: Russel, 1972), p.28.
9 rritiral History, p.257.
10 Ibid.
11 Op.cit. p.258.
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of experience of both the experientially sufficient and deficient are
explored. Such a logical stance made Hume assert that the terms
(language) signifying the content of human knowledge are based on a
dual foundation. One is personal meaning with reference to a private
world of experience. And the other is public meaning in reference to
a public world of shared experience. With these in mind, Hume's
epistemology can now be laid out as expounded in both the Treatise
and the Enquiry.
Elements of Cognition
Hume's subscription to the empirical tradition of Locke and
Berkeley is made clear in his agreement with them concerning the
primacy of experience in human understanding. Experience is the
starting point of all the facets and operations of human knowledge.
It is the whole range and plethora of perceptions upon which human
knowledge is rooted. Hume's uniqueness however lies in his
conception of distinctives in which perceptions are experienced in
the operation of cognition. Hume asserts that perceptions come to us
in impressions and ideas. These impressions and ideas may either be
simple or complex. Their simplicity and complexity depends largely
upon the degree of distinctions and separations in the impressions
and ideas themselves. Operationally, it is in the impressions that
perceptions are experienced as sensations, passions, and feelings.^ ^
And it is in the ideas that these sensations, passions, and feelings are
12 Hume Selections, p.9-12.
13 Gaskin, p.74.
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imaged in thinking and reasoning. There has always been a
tendency to assume that Hume meant images as copies of
impressions when he refers to ideas. McNabb is an avid proponent
of this in his book on Hume. This view can be supported in the
earlier Hume of the Treatise when he espoused a rigid psychological
empiricism. But it is clear that the mature Hume did not hold on
tenaciously to the definition of ideas as imaged copies of impressions.
In fact Hume uses "idea" for a number of ideas that cannot be
regarded as images or copies. Nevertheless he fails to make the
distinction between ideas and images. But as Gaskin points out,
Hume's use of ideas as images does not necessarily imply ideas as
copies of impressions (which is McNabb's position). Rather Hume's
meaning for ideas should be interpreted as thoughts of
impressions. 16 As thoughts of impressions, ideas therefore function
as images of impressions without necessarily being copies of them.
The impression-idea distinction is the cornerstone of Humean
epistemology. It is the modal operation in which perceptions are
experienced as the basis for cognition. Perceptions as the content of
all operations of understanding are impressions and ideas to the
knowing subject. From simple and complex impressions come simple
and complex ideas. Perceptions are experienced primarily as
impressions of sensation and secondarily as impressions of
14 Ibid.
15 Mound, p.67.
16 Gaskin, p.75-79.
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reflection. 17 As perceptions are experienced in impressions of sense,
the ideas of these impressions arise as sense ideas. The vividness
and feeling of these impressions of sensation are imprinted in ideas
of sensation that such ideas trigger other impressions. These other
impressions are impressions of reflection on the sense ideas. The
point here is that Hume seeks to account for the way in which certain
perceptions after being experienced vividly at a certain point can be
experienced again in the mind after its initial occurrence. So that
impressions of sensation can be experienced again as impressions of
reflection. The former stems from the actual experience of the
perceptions. The latter stems from the ideas that come from the
impressions of that actual experience. Without impressions we have
no ideas. And without ideas we have no knowledge of anything.
This sort of principle enables Hume to introduce the function of
memory and imagination. The distinctions of sensation and
reflection in impressions are paralleled by the operations of memory
and imagination in ideas. The assumption in Hume's theory is that
ideas involved in conceptions, propositions, and judgments are
grounded in memory and imagination. Both rest heavily upon the
operation of sense impressions and reflective impressions. The ideas
of sense (which are based on sense impressions) conjure reflective
impressions that give rise to further ideas. In memory, the ideas
that arise out of reflective impressions have very little variation, if
17 Francis Snore, Morals. Motivation, and Convention (Cambridge: UP, 1991), p. 13.
18 Pabitra K. Roy, David Hume (Calcutta: Sanskrit, 1970), p.l9.
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any, from the actual sense impressions. Thus ideas of memory are
sort of secondary sense ideas replicated from reflective impressions
as if they arose out of the actual sense impressions themselves. In
this way, Hume was able to account for recollection as a function of
the human mind. Imagination however can be differentiated from
memory .19 Like memory, ideas of imagination stem from reflective
impressions. But such ideas have a high degree of variation and are
intentionally variable from the actual sense impressions. Based upon
the operation of sense impressions and reflective impressions, ideas
of imagination lay out concepts, precepts, and propositions, as well as
(sort of) secondary sense ideas. But ideas of imagination vary
greatly if not totally from actual sense impressions and are not
necessarily recollections nor replicas of them. Thus the difference
between memory and imagination is not operational but relational.
It is in their relation to the actual sense impressions and not in their
actual operation that they are distinct.
Hume's emphasis on imagination is of such a nature that he traces
the gamut of human understanding to it as a source. 20 This is
understandable because unlike memory, imagination is not bound to
the experience of actual perceptions. Thus the ideas that comprise
our knowledge outside our sensations are rooted in imagination. Our
ideas concerning experience, custom, habit, and even memory as
precepts and principles find their source in imagination. Hume's
definition of faith and belief in certain propositions are grounded
19 Op.cit. p.24.
20 Op.cit. p.30
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cognitively upon the operation in imagination. Most of the contents
of belief are ideas that are not replications of sense ideas. If they are
then belief is based upon memory. And if so, then faith becomes a
recollection of actual perceptions. But belief requires assent to that
which is for the most part, beyond actual perceptions. Therefore
ideas of belief involve imagination and not memory. And Hume
declares that much of human understanding rests upon ideas that
find their source in imagination.
Natural Relations
Hume's unique appreciation for imagination as the grounds for
human knowledge is elucidated in his theory of the association of
ideas. Perceptions are experienced as impressions. When thoughts
on impressions arise as ideas, the simplicity and complexity of these
ideas are associated and related. This process of association and
relation is the operational locus of cognition where the content of
knowledge is understood. As mentioned in the preceding section,
this sort of activity is far removed from the actual sense impressions
though they are grounded on them. Hence, such ideas involved in
association and relation are ideas of imagination. It is in the
imagination that the association and relation of ideas from
impressions pave the way for the formulation of conclusions about
the perceptions experienced. Such conclusions are the essence of our
knowledge about the world, about God, and about the self.
As more perceptions are experienced, the formulation of
conclusions about the perceptions expand. So that a pattern and
system of ideas is developed concerning the perceptions. This
system operates by habit and custom based upon the perceptions
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experienced. It becomes habitual because the ideas related in the
pattern are based upon impressions of repeated perceptions. Hume's
account of abstract and universal ideas is an excellent illustration of
this. A universal idea arises out of particular ideas that are annexed
and conjoined by custom because of repeated impressions. 21 The
universal idea itself is an individual idea. But it arises out of the
various ideas from impressions associated by custom or habit.22 And
this idea represents the conglomeration of particular ideas so related.
Therefore abstractions are actually general ideas of various
individual ideas joined together habitually due to the consistent
experience of repeated perceptions. The bottom line of these ideas
that arise out of association is two-fold. In one aspect the association
of ideas rest upon experience. The basis of ideas being related lies in
the manner in which perceptions are experienced as impressions. On
another aspect, the association of ideas rest upon custom and habit.
The manner in which perceptions are experienced as impressions
creates the compulsion to associate certain ideas. For Hume it is the
consecution and regularity of impressions as experienced perceptions
in one aspect that powers habit and custom in another aspect. This
force of association is such an inherent operation of human
understanding that its results are aptly termed as natural relations.
Natural relations are relations among ideas that find support in
the regularity of experienced perceptions and in the compelling
influence of custom. Such natural relations are the products of the
21 Mounds, p. 168.
22 Ibid.
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force of association. Smith describes this relation as "a kind of
attraction ... due to the instincts or propensities that constitute our
human nature... it is natural, inevitable, and indespensable".2 3
It is the secret tie or union among particular ideas that
causes the mind to conjoin them more frequently
together, and makes one upon its appearance, introduce
the other.2 4
This description of natural relations is another peculiar feature of
Hume's doctrine of ideas. Hume makes the point that these ideas
involved in association are separate and distinct from each other as
they are based upon impressions of loose and independent
perceptions. 25 But the association of these ideas is in the fact that
they are related like bricks pieced together to form a structured
whole. 26 Our ideas of resemblance (likeness), contiguity (continuity)
in time and space, and causation (cause-effect) are the full
expressions of natural relations. As ideas are connected this way,
certain ideas cannot be considered without expecting other ideas
related to them as previously experienced and as habitually
expected. With this inherent operation in the mind we thus form
connections between our perceptions and consider them as necessary
connections. This necessary connection is not inherently evident in
23 N.K. Smith, The Credibility of Divine Existence, ed. A.J.D. Porteous, et. al. (New
York: Macmillan, 1967), pp.97-99.
24 Paul Kuntz, "Hume's Metaphysics: A New Theory of Order", Religious Studies
(y.l2. Dec. 1976), p.405.
25 Op.cit. p.406.
26 Ibid.
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the perceptions themselves. What is evident are the individual
perceptions experienced as distinct impressions which give rise to
ideas. The ideas out of these experienced perceptions are necessarily
connected by custom and habit. But it is in these necessary
connections that the perceptions are understood.
The depths of natural relations in the necessary connection of
ideas are exemplified in Hume's theory of causation. Hume was
totally convinced that causation is an inherently human associational
operation. This is expressed in his prevailing attitude and maxim
that nothing arises without a cause. ^7 As perceptions are experienced
consecutively, they are primally related. This relation is
strengthened in the repeated experience of the consecution of the
perceptions. The relation then is established in the mind that the
initial perception causes the following perception. So that the idea of
one necessitates the expectation of the other by habit. Russell
observes that Hume's causation has an objective and a subjective
dimension. Objectively (by experience) it is perceived that A is
always followed by B in a sequence. ^8 Subjectively (by habit) the
impression (and its idea) of A causes the idea of B (necessary
relation). 29 Hume posits that the relation of two perceptions A and B
as cause and effect is not observable. What is observed is the
conjunction of A and B. The causative relation of A and B is natural
27 Roy, p.93.
28 Bertrand Russel, History of Western Philosophy (London: Allen, 1946), pp.691-
692.
29 Ibid.
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in the sense that it is driven by habit in the innate operation of
human understanding. This operation is instinctively real only in the
mind and not in actuality.
All our reasonings concerning cause and effects are
derived from nothing but custom.30
The nature of necessary connections are of this kind. So Hume draws
the implication that causation is the cornerstone of natural relations.
Closely allied with Hume's theory of natural relations is his
understanding of natural beliefs. By "natural belief he means the
innate conviction and set of assumptions that make up the
framework and mindset for everyday life. It is interesting to note
that the propositions that fall under this set of beliefs are those
which seem to be the conclusions resulting from natural relations.
Such conclusions are those that guide our ontological assertions
regarding the continuous and independent existence of bodies and
also of those regarding causal connection between objects. The
foundation of this set of beliefs is not rational but rather the
instinctive and habitual compulsions of human nature based upon
repeated perceptions. There is no capacity to prove these beliefs
beyond the perceptions nor through reason. Yet one cannot exist
without assuming them.32 Thus like natural relations, natural beliefs
are also due to those propensities that constitute our human nature.
Moreover, without this innate operation of association that results in
30 Op.cit. p.697.
31 Roy, p.54.
32 Ibid.
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natural relations, these beliefs would have no content nor foundation.
Therefore it is quite logical to assume that it is out of natural
relations that natural beliefs are formed and understood.
Philosophical Relations
In this theory of cognition Hume was able to reassess rationalism
and put it in its place. This intellectual achievement can be
elaborated in the exposition of Hume's theory of philosophical
relations. Collins interprets these relations as follows:
Philosophical relation is simply any matter of
comparison among objects, without implying any
connecting principle or associating bond. Certain
qualities of objects make them fit for mental
comparison, so that we may make an arbitrary union of
such objects or ideas (i.e. a union where there is no
natural force subjectively compelling the mind to refer
from one term to the other). 3 3
Compared to natural relations, philosophical relations are not
inherent in that they are not compelled by habit or custom. It is the
association and relation of ideas and impressions as deliberate
objects of human reasoning powered by imagination. In terms of
epistemological operation both natural and philosophical relations
stand on common ground. Both relations involve ideas of
imagination that find their roots ultimately from perceptions. The
distinction lies in the fact that natural relations are compelled by
habit and not reason. Philosophical relations on the other hand are
established not by habit but by the intentional operation of human
reason. In this model Hume shows how experience plays a role in
33 Collins, p.l 11-1 12.
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the point and potency of rationality. All ideas involved in this kind
of relations are grounded on perceptions. The ideas are associated
into seven types of relations: resemblance, identity, space-time,
quantity-number, degrees of quality, contrariety, and cause-effect. 3 4
All relations are founded upon some common quality distributed
among the ideas to be related.35 Without this common quality there
is no resemblance. And without resemblance there is no ground for
comparison or relation.36 Thus just as causation is intimated as the
cornerstone of natural relations, resemblance is referred to as the
basis for philosophical relations. But there is no doubt that these
relations are ultimately grounded on experience.
So once again Hume makes another strategic distinction. There
are philosophical relations established among certain ideas, that are
invariable. The invariable relations depend exclusively on the ideas
under comparison. As long as the ideas remain the same, the
relations also remain the same. 37 Hume aptly terms these types of
relations the relations of ideas. Invariable relations involve
resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety, and quantity-number.
These types revolve around questions of logic in the process of
demonstrative reasoning. 38 Such propositions are analytic and a
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Roy, p.52.
Managbanag 27
priori and are thus possible to know by appealing to reason alone.
Much of mathematical and scientific certainty rest on these relations
of ideas. Conclusions concerning invariable relations are invariable
in the special sense that their contraries and contradictions are
inconceivable. 39 And maxims on relations of ideas can be considered
without resorting to experience.
There are also philosophical relations established among certain
ideas, that are variable. The variable relations depend exclusively
upon perceptions. Hence the relations between the ideas may
change because of the perceptions experienced. Although the ideas
might remain the same, the relations may vary because of
impressions that arise out of the changing perceptions. Such
relations have closer affinity to the objects in the perceptions
themselves rather than to the ideas of such objects. Hume again
appropriately terms this type of relations as matters of fact.
Variable relations involve identity, space-time, and cause-effect.
These types involve questions of fact and questions of value
ascertained in perceptions through inductive reasoning. Such
propositions are empirical and synthetic and are thus possible only
by appealing to experience."^ ^ Collins points out that the variable
types of identity and space-time are relations whose nature are more
like immediate perceptions rather than reasoned relations.^^ xhe
39 D.G.C. McNabb, David Hume (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966), p.46.
40 Collins, p.l 13.
41 McNabb, p.46.
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impressions and relations themselves are presented to the senses for
comparison. 4 3 The cause-effect relation however deals with a given
impression of an experienced perception from which a cause or effect
is reasoned that is not in the immediate perception. It is a reasoning
from what is given in experience to what is not given in it.
Nevertheless, conclusions concerning variable relations pertain
directly to perceptions whether they are reasoned or not. And
maxims on matters of fact cannot be considered without resorting to
experience. Since perceptions are the concentration of these
relations, conclusions concerning variable relations are variable in
the special sense that their contraries and contradictions are
conceivable. These relations rest exclusively on perceptions. Thus
various possibilities of such relations when projected beyond the
immediate perceptions are conceivable. The name of the game is
probability. Variable relations of matters of fact can afford
speculations of what is outside immediate experience based upon
previously experienced perceptions. The degree of probability is
therefore based upon close conformity to the variable relations
previously established of perceptions already experienced. Natural
causation however must be distinguished from philosophical
causation. The former is a necessary connection compelled by habit.
The latter is a variable relation reasonably and arbitrarily
approximated from perceptions.
42 Collins, p. 113.
43 Ibid.
44 McNabb, p.46.
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Hume's invariable and variable distinction in philosophical
relations has clearly put rationalism in its place. Reason alone can
deal with invariable relations of ideas. But it is totally out of place
when it deals with variable relations of matters of fact without
experience.
Conclusion
These features of Hume's theory of knowledge have become the
hallmark of Hume's philosophy. As shown previously, Hume's
account of human nature and understanding has provided the
demolition of rationalism. This is evident in Hume's exposition of the
limits and weakness of reason when it deals with certain areas of
knowledge. Yet in this conquest of rationalism, Hume bred a
particular philosophy that took empiricism to its ultimate end. So
that in Humean epistemology, the rationalism of Descartes and the
empiricism of Locke found their embarrassing consequences. This is
Hume's place in the history of philosophy. He put an end to the high
hopes of continental rationalism.'*^ The notion that the foundation of
knowledge are necessary conclusions deducible from self-evident
truths, is convincingly refuted in Hume. In the preceding section it
has been shown that reason in its analytic and a priori operation is
only valid when applied to philosophical relations of resemblance,
degrees of quality, contrariety, and quantity-number. As invariable
in nature they deal strictly with relations of ideas. The self-evidence
of conclusions from this rationalistic operation is strictly in the realm
45 Jerry Gill, The Possibility of Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1971), p.73.
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of ideas and are terribly deficient in accounting for the actual reality
of experience. In fact, without experience even the self-evidence of
deducible truths as ideas in invariable relations are empty. Hume's
basic assumption is that from impressions of experienced
perceptions, ideas are formed as contents of knowledge.
Furthermore, when it comes to matters of fact in actual perceptions,
analytic and a priori reasoning is out of place. The invariability of
rationalistic maxims as deductive cannot deal with the variability of
the relations involving experienced perceptions. Logical operations
are purely oblivious to the realities of experience. The rationalistic
method cannot deal with variable relations of matters of fact because
it is applicable only to the invariable relations of ideas. The eventual
direction of this thought leads to the conclusion that rationalism has
no ultimacy in human understanding. Reason takes a backseat to the
power of imagination ."^^ It is in the imagination that human
understanding operates as a cognitive process grounded in
experience. It is out of imagination that custom and habit compels
natural relations and that reasoning deals with philosophical
relations.
Hume does not only frustrate rationalistic ambitions but he also
puts an end to the high hopes of British empiricism. '^'^ The notion that
the foundation of knowledge are probable conclusions inducible from
sense impressions, bred a sceptical philosophy in Hume. If the sole
46 Charles Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (Princeton: UP, 1925),
pp. 72-73.
47 Gill. p.73.
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basis for knowledge is experience, then scepticism is a legitimate
philosophy. Since perceptions are the only pure realities of human
knowledge, whatever is not inherent and evident in the perceptions
are legitimate objects of doubt and uncertainty. Russel suggests that
Hume's scepticism rests entirely upon his rejection of induction
(applied to causation).^8 This however would be misleading unless it
is qualified. Hume rejects induction only when it is used as an
infallible basis for metaphysical speculation. Norton perceives that
Hume's philosophy developed as a response to two crises: a
speculative crisis and a moral crisis.'*^ Hume's response to both crises
differs in method and substance. Hume's philosophy is sceptical
when it comes to metaphysical speculation. But his philosophy is
practical when it comes to moral theory.50 Hume accepted a practical
common sense dogmatism as working beliefs needed to support
practical decisions. But he vigorously attacked speculative
dogmatism, finding it useful for scepticism. 5 2
Hume's sceptical empiricism is seen at its best in his views on the
metaphysical doctrines of externality, deity, and personality. (His
thoughts on deity will be discussed in the next chapter.) The
48 Russel, p.697.
49 David Norton, David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician
(Princeton: UP, 1982), p.9.
50 Ibid.
51 Collins, p.98.
52 Ibid.
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existence of a world external to our experience is suspect. This
conviction is based upon precepts of substance and relations of
continuity reasoned from our perceptions of objects and are not
inherent in them. From such perceptions come impressions of size,
shape, color (etc.) from which ideas of substance are inductively
developed. 53 From the consecutiveness and regularity of perceptions
come impressions and ideas that induces a conviction that there is a
relation of continuity of substance from one perception to the next.
In this train of thought Hume completed Berkeley's philosophy of
external bodies which the good bishop posited in deference to Locke.
But Hume goes beyond and pursues Berkeley's views to the end. For
Hume even the conviction of the self as a metaphysical existence is
suspect. In his section on "Personal Identity" he posits that the
notion of the self stems from inferences based upon experience. 5 4
Certain perceptions are experienced as impressions that give occasion
for ideas that become the basis for inductively forming precepts of
consciousness and freedom. These precepts form a certain sort of a
"republic or commonwealth" of perceptions that are causally
connected so that they compel the conviction of a substance called
the "self".55
Such were the daring conclusions of Hume's epistemology. In his
empirical philosophy, rationalism is humbled to a lowly place. In his
53 McNabb, p. 139-140.
54 Hume Selections, p.83-91.
55 Op.cit., p.90.
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thinking, empiricism when pursued to its ultimate end results in a
philosophy of academic scepticism.
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Chapter Three
Hume's Philosophy of Religion
Hume's sceptical empiricism in his theory of knowledge has
repercussions of some magnitude in his philosophy of religion. The
connection is inevitable because Hume's analysis of the validity of
religious claims assumes the framework of his epistemology. It is
quite clear that his views on religion cannot be studied without the
backdrop of the empiricism that is the hallmark of his theory of
knowledge. Hume's fundamental position in his philosophy of
religion is elaborated in section ten of the Enquiry. The bottom line
standard of our judgments on matters of religion is experience. ^
This assumption entails the whole spectrum of Humean
epistemology. If the validity of religious propositions rest only upon
the support of experience, then Hume's sceptical empiricism finds
entrance into the world of religious discussion. It is worthy of note
that there is nothing in Hume of that profound piety that one finds in
Kant. 2 In fact his attitude and posture towards religion is
characteristically that of an irony that borders on levity. 3 Kant's
criticism of accepted beliefs points to new directions for theology.'*
This is evident in Earth's dialectical theology and Bultmann's
1 David Hume, Hume on Religion, ed. R. Wolfheim ( New York: Meridian, 1964),
p.l7.
2 George Hendry, "David Hume's Bicentennial", Theologv Today (v.33, Jan. 1977),
p.405.
3 Ibid.
4 Op.cit., p.406.
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existential theology. ^ But there has never been a Humean theology
and there could never be so. Hume's sceptical empiricism is of such a
nature that it excludes the ultimate significance of theological
thinking. Hume had no evident hang-ups with religion.^ There is no
evidence in his biography of traumatic experiences that can be
explained as the underlying force beneath his attitude towards
religion. His approach to religion seems to spring from the
emancipated view of a detached observer. His emancipation is
expressed in the development of his critical faculties that enabled
him to persistently penetrate the issues of religion from one that is
outside of it.
The Humean assumption that experience should be the grounds
for understanding religion is quite significant. Hume's empiricism is
ultimate in that it is consistent to the end. Scepticism is the norm
when empiricist thinking is carried to its metaphysical conclusions.
The demonstration of this maxim in Hume's epistemology must be
considered in the light of its historical context. Hume's sceptical
empiricism did not come out of nowhere. It had a significant history
in the philosophical environment of the British isles during the
seventeenth and eighteenth century. In these centuries British
philosophy gave rise to two philosophical outlooks. ^ One was the
golden period of English theology when reason became
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Paul Russel, "Skepticism and Natural Religion in Hume's Treatise", Journal of the
vUcjnrY of Ideas (v.49, April-June 1988), p.248.
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unequivocably yoked to Christian theology. Theology was
considered as a body of necessary truths. This was of course a carry
over of the rationalism that rose from the European continent. The
other outlook was the sceptical tradition that was fueled by the rise
of science and the scientific method. This tradition found its major
proponent in Hobbes. Hobbes took the inherent naturalism of the
scientific method and applied it to humanity. The result was a highly
materialistic outlook that rejected all religious claims. At this point
Hobbes drew first blood and incited a barrage of apologetic responses
from the religious community. Locke joined the attempt to refute
Hobbes' conclusion about religion. In his Essay Locke put forward a
demonstration of God's existence from the ideas of God that rise from
experience. 8 In the his Boyle lectures Clarke followed Locke by
showing how pure theology rested on an immovable basis of
intuitive truths connected and logicalized by astute rational
demonstration. 9 Clarke's attack on the atheism of Hobbes was the
raging issue of the day when Hume wrote his Treatise. iQ The whole
debate involved the clash of arguments and apologetics that
depended on two intellectual movements: rationalism and
empiricism. The philosophical contenders were drawing from both
these standpoints of reason and experience to show the faults of
their opponent. In this context it can be determined with a certain
8 Op.Cit., p.250.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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degree of clarity, the motivations behind Hume's interest in religion.
There are three positions as to why Hume was interested in
religion. 11 Hendel posits that Hume's religious interest was spurred
by inner conflicts within his own mind. N.K. Smith proposes that
Hume was interested in the prominence religion plays in the lives of
people. He disagrees with the thesis that Hume was powered by a
strong desire to free mankind from error and superstition because
Hume's passive temperament did not show this zeal.i^ The most
reasonable position on Hume's motivations concerning religion is that
he was concerned with the limits of human understanding. 13 In the
height of the great debate between Hobbes and Clarke, Hume's
Treatise was being born. It is clear from this work that Hume
assesses human nature and its capabilities for knowledge and
morality. The fact is that Hume's epistemology has the explicit aim
of stabilizing the area of human knowledge by exploring its proper
limits. 1"^ The result of this epistemological concern and exploration is
evident in Hume's conclusions about religion. But such conclusions
cannot be considered without keeping in mind Hume's conclusions
about the debate itself as based upon two philosophical movements.
In Hume's theory of knowledge, rationalism is castigated and
empiricism is forced to be consistent to the end. The result is
11 David Hume: Manv-Sided Genius, eds. K. Merril and R. Shahan (Oklahoma:UP,
1976), pp.60-62.
12 Ibid.
13 Op.Cit., p.63.
14 Hume, p. 16.
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traceable in Hume's assessment that religious claims exceed the
limits of human understanding. Rationalist theology which Christian
orthodoxy had unreservedly allied itself with seeks to extend the
limits. Sceptical materialism in its empirical attitude seeks to
contract it. Hume was convinced that both bodies of thinkers
ultimately have the same effect. They "... disturbed the ordinary
unreflecting animal bodies by which life is ordinarily lived." The
rationalist hopes for more and the sceptic distrusts what they have. 1 6
Hume's philosophy of religion therefore is a fitting conclusion of
his epistemology. The sceptical empiricism of his theory of
knowledge when applied to religion also seeks to put reason in its
place and to follow the consequences of experience. His philosophy
of religion is an evaluation of the religious debate of his time in
which both sides end up losers. The materialist is rebuffed in the
Humean conclusion about matter and substance (the world). The
religionist is ridiculed in the Humean conclusion about the existence
of God. It is the latter that shall be the focus of this chapter.
Hume's Religious Writings
Hume's literary works on religious subjects make interesting
reading. As Wolfheim puts it, "they are systematically irreverent,
witty, and clever, and full of unexpectedly deep insights into the
pathology of religious belief '.^'^ Hume, as previously noted, has
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Op.Cit., p.9
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surmised that religious claims exceed the limits of human
understanding. Thus Hume's philosophy of religion attempts to
demonstrate certain conclusions. ^ 8 One is that there are no rational
grounds for theism. Here Hume defies Clarke's rational arguments
for the existence of God. Another conclusion is that appeals to
revelation can convince no reasonable person of theism. At this
point Hume derided most of the Orthodox theologians of his time.
The last three conclusions are the creative results of Hume's own
thinking. One is that belief in God has its origins in human nature.
The other is that this belief has adverse moral effects. And the last
is that theistic arguments from design are misreadings of our natural
propensity to perceive order in nature. These conclusions deducible
from Hume's philosophy of religion, are all the outworkings of his
theory of knowledge expounded in the last chapter.
Hume's work on religion comprises essays in his Enquiry, and two
major works. The two major writings that deal explicitly with
religion are the Natural History of Religion and the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. In his introduction to the Natural
History, editor H.E. Root states that these two works marked the
beginning of what is now generally known (if loosely) as the field of
philosophy of religion. Hume's other writings are: the essays Of
Miracles . and Of A Particular Providence And A Future State in the
18 W.D. Hudson, "Review of Hume's Philosophy of Religion", by J.C.A. Gaskin, The
Fvpn^iprv Times (v. 100, Dec.1988), p.l5.
19 David Hume, The Natural Historv of Religion, ed. H.E. Root (Stanford, CA: UP,
1957), p.7
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Enquiry- In these writings Hume wrestles with three basic religious
issues. First, whether theism as a rational possibility is based on
valid grounds of argument and reasoning. It is this issue that is the
crux of the design argument. Here Hume deals with natural religion
as religious claims based on demonstrative reasoning and empirical
argument. Second, whether theism is an empirical possibility based
on valid grounds of inductive reasoning. It is this issue that is
central to his discussion on miracles. Here Hume deals with revealed
religion as religious claims based on inductive reasoning and
empirical argument. And third, whether religion itself is a
phenomenon based upon history and experience. The focus of this
issue is the nature of religion itself and its reality in human life. In
the Dialogues Hume tackles the first issue of natural religion. He
explores the foundation of religion in reason.20 In the essay on
Miracles Hume deals with the second issue of revealed religion.
Mossner suggests that Hume's essay on Providence must be read
together with his essay on Miracles. 21 In the Providence essay Hume
confronts the idea of a provident God who who bestows general
providence on all creation. 22 In the essay on Miracles Hume
confronts the idea of a provident God who bestows special
providence on certain creatures through miracles. 23 In the Natural
20 Op.Cit., p. 10.
21 James Force, "Hume and the Relation of Science to Religion Among Certain
Members of the Royal Society", Journal of the History of Ideas (v.45, no.4, Oct.-Dec.
1984). p.528.
22 Ibid.
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History Hume faces the third issue of religion as an empirical and
historical phenomenon. He explores the origins of religion in human
nature. 24
These three issues shall be dealt with systematically in this
chapter. The section on natural religion will deal with the first. The
section on revealed religion will deal with the second. And the
section on the nature of religion will deal with the last. The section
on natural religion however will be anticipatory of the next chapter
which concentrates entirely on the Dialogues. Thus that subject will
be discussed at full length in that chapter rather than this one.
Natural Religion
Hume's main contention against the religious establishment of his
day concerned the question of whether theism could be based on
sound argument and reasoning. Since the church had accepted the
tenets of rationalism, it was assumed that the existence of God was a
demonstrable and necessary maxim which could be clearly proven
by argument. It was the prevailing notion that religion is naturally
inherent to humanity since it is inherent to reason. There are two
basic strands of theistic argument that were pervasive in Hume's
day. These arguments have been articulated in various forms and
versions. The arguments in their primal form however, stem from
two medieval philosophers. One is Anselm's ontological argument
and the other is Aquinas' five proofs. Anselm's argument
propounded that a necessarily being exists by virtue of the
23 Ibid.
24 Natural, p. 10.
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conception of its idea alone. This became much more sophisticated in
Descartes. And Aquinas' proposal of a necessarily existent being as
the logical end of causal reasoning was much in vogue in British
circles. It invoked fresh insights that made it possible for British
intellectuals to formulate both rational and empirical arguments.
The rationalist dimension of Aquinas' argument was posited by
Clarke's a priori maxims. The empirical dimension was eloquently
articulated by Butler's argument from design. Hume was intensely
critical and suspicious of both reasonings and subjected them to
penetrating analysis. The point has to be made that a great deal of
Hume's criticisms have been directed at those arguments that stem
from Aquinas rather than those that take their cue from Anselm.
The reason for this might be found in the nature of Hume's
philosophical bias. As an empiricist he probably considered the
arguments from design a much more serious problem. Since
Aquinas' reasonings are much closer to the empirical tradition, it had
much more appeal to the empiricist than Anselm's argument, which
was more attractive to the rationalist. Whatever the case may be it
is clear that it was the empirical arguments for theism in the
tradition of Aquinas that Hume dealt with extensively as crucial to
natural religion.
Hume's response to Anselm's ontological argument and its
refinement in Descartes can be deduced from his epistemological
writings in the Treatise. Anselm posited that to conceive the idea of
a most perfect being would be contradictory if such a being did not
exist in actuality. Descartes elaborated this argument by proposing
Managbanag 43
that existence is implied by the idea of a most perfect being.25 Hence,
the existence of God as a most perfect being is as certain as a
geometrical demonstration. 26 Hume charged that the issue really
involves the epistemological relation between existence and the
conception of a thing. The idea of a most perfect being is not
different from conceiving that this being exists. In other words,
ideas of being and ideas of existence are the same ideas. The idea of
a thing or object is not separate or distinct from the idea of it as
existent. The idea of being and the idea of existence of an object can
involve the same simple idea or the same complex idea.
Thus when we affirm that God is existent we simply
form the idea of such a being as he is represented to us;
nor is the existence, which we attribute to him,
conceived by a particular idea, which we join to the idea
of his other qualities, and can again separate and
distinguish from them (Treatise).27
Thus it is clear that existence and the conception of a thing involve
the same idea or set of ideas. And conjoining the two together does
not add nor change the ideas involved. This clarification is crucial
because Hume insists that even if Descartes surmises that the
existence of God is deducible from the ideas of God as a most perfect
being, it does not entail that this God exists in actuality. Hume's
point is that when we declare that a certain object exists, we mean
25 Gaskin, p.72.
26 Ibid.
27 Op.Cit., p.71.
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epistemologically that our idea or ideas of this object as being (or
existing) is exemplified in the real or actual world. Hume believed
that the explication of the ontological argument is faulty. He
understands the argument as a matter of ideas being exemplified in
actuality. This move makes the ontological argument prey to Hume's
strategic distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact.
The ontological reasoning operates entirely in the realm of a priori
relations of ideas. Since this category of ideas are invariable in their
relations, it is possible to conceive ideas of being and existence as
such that their contraries are inconceivable. Therefore in the realm
of relations of ideas Anselm's contention is valid. The idea of a most
perfect being can be considered to exist necessarily so that its
negation is inconceivable. But when this necessary existence in
relations of ideas is brought to bear in actuality where relations are
variable, then Anselm's argument loses its potency. In Hume's
framework, when the existence of a most perfect being becomes a
relation of matters of fact, then its contrary is conceivable in the
world of experience and actuality. It is no surprise then that when
Clark sought an a priori argument for theism, he resorted to Aquinas
rather than Anselm. Clark argues that a being can be conceived such
that to suppose that being not to exist is inconceivable. He supports
this position by demonstrating analytically, the cosmic need to
postulate a first cause which in itself contains sufficient reason for its
own existence. 28 Hume countered this by reiterating that any
argument that proclaims necessary existence based upon the
28 Op.Cil.,p.73.
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operation of cause and effect must base it entirely on experience not
reason. 29 (This issue is elaborated in Hume's Dialogues and will
therefore be discussed at length in the next chapter.)
The second strand of theistic arguments were however, in Hume's
view, more serious than a priori and ontological arguments. As
mentioned previously, Hume recognized the potency of these
arguments because they appear to be based upon empirical grounds.
The religious motivation behind this empirically-based reasoning
was attempting to secure a firm foundation for religious propositions
acceptable to a sound mind and common sense. 30 The grand
achievement of this attempt was the argument from design. 3 1 This
theistic argument as already noted, was defended by Aquinas. But
after its baptism into British empiricism, the argument acquired
empirical dimensions to its rationality that Hume considered it a
serious challenge. The canonical formulation of this argument is
found in Butler's Analogy of Religion. 32 Simply put, the design
argument declares that the universe when experienced and
perceived, exhibits a certain order and design that conveys the
impression that its cause is an intelligent mind. The intelligent and
mental nature of this cause is understood to be similar to that of
human intelligence and mind. The underlying principle of the design
29 Ibid.
30 Hume, p. 16.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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argument therefore rests on two factors. There is the operation of
cause and effect wherein the cause is inferred from perceptions of
the universe. Then there is the reasoning from analogy wherein the
cause is likened to human intelligence and mind. It is quite evident
why Hume would consider this reasoning seriously. The design
argument follows Hume's dictum of grounding causation in
experience. Furthermore, the analogical reasoning that the argument
follows also claims evidence in human experience. It is with
intensive care then that Hume responds to this argument in his
Dialogues (which shall be treated in the next chapter).
In Hume's epistemological writings, he intimates a lot of the
analysis which he applies to the design argument in the Dialogues.
Here Hume discusses the theistic claims within the explicit terms of
his theory of knowledge. For instance, Hume charges that theological
issues about the existence of God do not stem from our experience of
deity but from our experience of the world. We experience
perceptions of mobility in matter. From these perceptions we get
impressions that enable us to form ideas of power and motion. 3 3
Hume claims that we do not perceive power nor motion but rather
mobility in matter. 34 The ideas of power and motion stem from our
impressions of mobility in matter which are derived from
experienced perceptions. Since power and motion are not found in
33 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1888), pp.159-160.
34 Ibid.
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the perceptions, then the cause of power and motion is not found in
the same perceptions. 3 5 The cause of every perceived movement and
alteration in matter is not inherent nor available to the perceptions
of matter. The Cartesian solution is that the cause is deduced as
immaterial: the supreme spirit or deity. 36 This deity is the prime
mover and immediate cause of every movement and alteration in
matter. 37 Hume then concludes that the idea of deity is no different
from the idea of force and motion. There are no impressions of deity
evident in the perceptions. What is inherent in the perceptions is
that of mobility in matter from which the idea of deity is postulated
as ultimate cause. 38 The empiricist dependence on causation is thus
faced with a delimma in Hume. On the one hand Hume poses a
sceptical attitude towards a metaphysical view of empirical
causation. In the actuality of our perceptions there is no inherent
causal relation. Causation is a natural relation that the mind
epistemologically makes as a necessary connection between ideas of
objects. 39 If this is so, then the idea of deity as cause for perceptions
of mobility (or any perception) is not supported by any impression
or perception because as a cause it is not perceived. Therefore the
idea of infinitely powerful beings are inseparable from connections
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Op.Cit., pp.248-250.
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of power.40 No insight is available into this power or connection.^!
Therefore there is no insight available in the assumption of deity as a
postulated cause. On the other hand, the flipside to Hume's denial of
causation as actual is his assertion that objects constantly conjoined
are regarded as causes and effects.^2 in the actuality of our
perceptions we make connections between objects directly from
experience. When we postulate causes we are only making
connections in the mind which are thus not inherent in our
perceptions. In the event that we infer a cause for objects in our
perceptions that is not inherent in them, we are making a variable
relation. This type of causation is a philosophical relation involving
matters of fact. If this sort of relation is behind the idea of deity,
then contrary ideas and postulates are also possible causes for
objects in our perceptions. Hume concludes that one can propose
anything to be the cause of anything.43 The ultimate end to this
delimma is clear. The idea of deity is unacceptable as a cause in both
natural and philosophical relations. Therefore, based upon Humean
epistemology, there is no room for an exclusive appeal to theism as a
necessary and sufficient cause of anything metaphysical (nor
physical) in natural religion. This implication is expressed in the
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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intensive drama of the Dialogues where the design argument is taken
to task.
Revealed Religion
Hume was not content with denying the rational integrity of
religious claims. He also proceeded even further by criticizing the
most sacred ground of religious belief. Hume not only attempted to
show that religion cannot hold onto reason as its ground, but he also
challenged the notion that theism is an empirical possibility. This
possibility was based upon inductive reasoning from actual events,
experiences, and perceptions. The matter centered around the belief
that religious claims are supported by experience itself. Theism as a
valid belief is grounded upon perceptions directly indicative of the
workings of deity. These claims for theism are much harder to
dismiss than those of natural religion.^^ Their nature is historical in
that they present the events that occur which provide direct
evidence for their truth.45 Unlike claims in natural religion, these
theistic propositions are the heart and soul of religion itself. And
these propositions are assumed and argued to be true in experience
and perceptions. Thus they are considered historical. The wisdom of
Mossner's suggestion about Hume's religious writings on revealed
religion is appropriate. The essay on Providence as well as the essay
on Miracles in the Enquiry are two sides of Hume's explorations on
this aspect of religion. The belief in a provident God who bestows
general and special providence, finds its basis on empirical and
44 David, p.73.
45 Ibid.
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historical events and experiences. It must be emphasized at this
point that Hume varies in his treatment of the two beliefs. With
regards to general providence, Hume uses arguments that are similar
to his objections against natural religion. He resorts to the
epistemological operation of causation. But with regards to special
providence, Hume resorts to the epistemological operation of
probability. Although causation and probability are related
operations in Hume's theory of knowledge, their emphasis in his
arguments on general and special providence are different. With
respect to the issue of general providence, Hume concentrates more
on the cause-effect dimension. In the matter of special providence,
he stresses the dimension of probability rather than explicit
causation.
The conviction of a deity that bestows general providence is a
causal conclusion from certain perceptions. The claim is that there is
a deity that supervises and cares for the existence of the world and
its creatures, foreseeing their wants and needs and caring for them.
Hume argues that this conviction is an inference based upon
observed effects.46 From our perceptions we get impressions and
ideas of satisfaction, safety, security, and so on, which are observable
in events and experiences. From such impressions and thoughts we
infer the cause to be that of a deity that cares and supervises. As
with the causal argument in natural religion, Hume points out that
this provident deity is not inherent in the observed events and
experiences. Rather it is an inference that explains the perceptions
46 Force, p.528.
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as the effects of a divine cause. Hume once again comes back to his
theory of knowledge by insisting that inferred causes must be
proportional to the evidence of observed effects.^7 He admits that the
inference of a provident creator does account for the empirical
effects, i.e. the moral and physical phenomena.48 But Hume insists
that this inference should only be proportionally sufficient for the
empirical effects. If the inference of a provident creator is
proportional cause then it is only one of many possibilities that can
sufficiently account for the empirical effects. Since this is the case
then the idea of a provident creator cannot have exclusive claim as
proportional cause for such effects. If the possible inference of a
cause must be suited precisely to the effects, then there are multiple
possibilities of equal validity. Hume surmised that this recognition
will lead to confusion or doubt.49 So why torture yourself with
believing in what cannot be exclusively claimed as true? Corollary to
the notion of general providence is the belief in a future state. The
provident God will determine after this life, ultimate rewards and
judgments for virtues and sins. Providential justice which at present
is perceived only in part, will finally be experienced in its full extent
in a future state of the afterlife.^o Hume again reiterates the same
causal argument within the context of his epistemological framework.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Anders Jeffner. Butler and Hume nn Religion (Stockholm: Bokforlag, 1966), p.96.
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He allows that one can assume deity as the originator of a certain
order in nature that is perceived. The experienced perceptions of
rewards for virtue and punishment for wrongdoing in the present
life can lead to the inference of Divine providence as cause. But
Hume again repeats the epistemological maxim that inferred causes
must be suited precisely to the effects. Therefore properties
ascribed to the cause must be only the qualities that are strictly
required to bring about the experienced effect. Nothing more and
nothing less.^i Hume insistently declares that there is no reason to
give any particular extent to any cause but only as far as it accounts
for the present perceptions. Thus it is doubly ridiculous to infer
other effects (from an already inferred cause), that goes beyond the
perceptions of this present life. Hume concluded that the notion of
God as one who rewards virtue to any greater extent in a future life
is sheer fantasy.
The whole and intention of man's creation so far as we
can judge by natural reason is limited to the present
life.53
Hume's response to the notion of a God who bestows special
providence does not insist upon causal argument. The historical
claims of providence statements are intensified when they pertain to
specific instances and events where an exceptional and special
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Op.Cit., p.lOl.
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perception is experienced. The cause is of course strictly applied to
deity and at that particular point does not exceed its limits. The
difficulty of dismissing this notion is the problem that Hume faces in
his essay on Miracles. It must be clarified however that Hume's
contention is not to deny the possibility of miracles. He argues
against the belief that miracles authenticate divine revelation so as
to establish the theistic claims of a religion.54 Hume rejected the
acceptance of special providence in miracles as a foundation for
religion. He is not able to refute this claim by virtue of causal
argument because they fit his causal prescription. The cause is
strictly applied to the effect. His contention therefore is to block any
attempts at inferring and ascribing other effects to the same cause.
Thus Hume can allow a miracle but he cannot allow the gamut of
religious claims to be based on it. Since Hume is unable to refute
miracles by causation, he approaches the issue from another
epistemological angle: the operation of probability. The possibility of
the inferred cause cannot be denied in its specificity and sufficiency.
Consequently, Hume considers the issue in a wider and more general
context of cause and effects. He does this by ensuring that a miracle
is considered in the wider scope of general causes and effects. And
such causes and effects are demonstrated to be pervasively
descriptive of specific cases of causation. This is where Hume
appeals to general public experience and its distinction from private
experience. It is in this light that he brings in the argument from the
laws of nature as public knowledge. Hume made the issue not a
54 Gaskin, p. 125.
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matter of causal argument but a matter of probability. The
possibility of a miracle and its causal explanation is not discounted as
a matter of fact. But its probability is pitted against the probability
that the event was caused by natural laws as known in general
public experience. In his notes to "Miracles", Hume defined a miracle
as a transgression of a law of nature by particular volition of deity or
interposition of some invisible agent. ^5 it is clear that Hume
maneuvers the issue of miracles into his epistemological distinctions
of general public experience and specific private experience. As a
matter of fact, the inexplicable instances of violations of natural laws
in miracles are allowed as conceivable. But Hume attempts to
circumvent the plausibility of this by appealing to the argument
from probability. To accept miracles as evidence for divine
revelation, two criteria must be considered. ^6 The evidence of a
miracle must be stronger than the evidence from the laws of nature.
And the veracity of human testimony concerning a miracle must be
established without question. Hume has two factors going for him.
For the most part, our access to miracles, particularly when it
pertains to religion, comes through the testimony of witnesses. Also,
there are alleged miracles that are simply instances of ignorance of
certain laws of nature that are now public knowledge and
experience. Therefore the second criteria is really what is at stake in
Hume's onslaught. The evidence for miracles must be strong enough
55 E.J. Lowe, "Miracles and Laws of Nature", Religious Studies (v.23, June 1987),
p.263.
56 Gaskin, p.l 13.
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to dispel the strength of the probability that stems from the never-
failing regularity of certain facts. That Jesus was resurrected must
be a stronger probability than the probability of our habitual pattern
of perceptions that no one is resurrected. But based upon
experience, it is more probable that Jesus was not risen rather than
that he was risen. The strength of a miracle's probability therefore
depends heavily on the credibility of the witnesses. But Hume
observes that the reliability of the witnesses is seriously impaired:
when there is no total agreement of the witnesses, when they are
few, and when they have a bias towards what they affirm.58 Hume
concludes that the instances of special providence fail to meet the
two criteria of evidence. The probability of the experienced
regularities is always greater than the probability of a witness being
right when he or she claims what is contrary to the established
regularities. 59 And the veracity of the testimonies cannot be
established without question. It is no surprise then when Hume
declares that "there is no testimony sufficient to establish a miracle,
unless such a testimony is of such a kind that its falsehood would be
more miraculous ".^o He also argues that if miracles give authenticity
to divine revelation of a religion, then many religions are credible
because of the wealth of purported miracles that these religions
57 R.E. Huswit, "On Hume's Definition of a Miracle: Backtracking a Confusion",
Journal of Religious Studies (v. 12, no.l, 1985), p.l.
58 Gaskin, p.l 13.
59 Jeffner, p. 120.
60 Gaskin, pp.1 13-1 14.
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proclaim. 61 Thus Hume is convinced that miracles can never be
proven so as to be the foundation of religion.62 Flew observes that
Hume's intention was to show that miracles cannot be used as
evidence for theism.63 Hume included prophecies in his criticism of
miracles. As evidence of a provident deity, the ability of the prophet
to transcend the limits of human nature in foretelling and
proclaiming divine oracles is a miraculous process in itself. 6 4
In his deliberations concerning natural and revealed religion,
Hume has shut down two claims to authentic religion that the church
in his time faithfully proclaimed. One is that of a naturally inherent
religion and the other is that of divine revelation. Both have no
monopoly on the evidence from experience.
The Nature of Religion
The Natural History is a concrete testimony to Hume's creativity
and ingenuity as an explorative thinker. In this work, he becomes
less of a reactionary and more of a daring pioneer. His arguments
and criticisms on the subjects of natural and revealed religion are for
the most part, answers to what has already been posited and
claimed. Hume sets up to challenge such dogmatic notions and thus
becomes explicitly reactionary. In the Natural History he is still in a
sense reacting to the religious debate of his time. But the difference
61 Fmpiricists. pp. 397-398.
62 Jeffner, p. 120.
63 Ibid.
64 Force, p.531.
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is that Hume comes out proposing an account of religion not to
explicitly refute other accounts but rather to present his proposal as
more appropriate. In other words, Hume's Natural History was less
of a reaction and more of an initiated program. This achievement
demonstrates Hume's acute intellectual abilities. The Natural History
is Hume's exploration of the origins of religion in human nature.65
He seeks to determine the origin of religious beliefs and practices in
an effort to answer the question why people entertain religious
beliefs and indulge in religious practices. ^6 It is noticeable that Hume
very seldom (if at all) in this endeavor resorts explicitly to his
epistemological framework. His theory of knowledge is more
intimated than explicated in the Natural History. It is probably due
to the fact that Hume is less reactionary in these discussions that he
largely assumes his epistemological bias rather than bringing it to
the fore. But in exploring the origins of religion in human nature,
Hume uses a method that reflects his epistemology. Price notes that
Hume utilized the historical-anthropological method in accounting for
religion in human nature.67 This method already assumes that
religion is a purely natural phenomena. There are two features to
this method that are implicated in Hume's study. The first feature is
the primacy of experience. The facts that Hume claims as evidence
are based strictly on perceptions from history and experience. The
65 N!^t^l^;^l History, p. 10.
66 Ibid.
67 John Price, David Hume (New York: Twayne, 1968), p. 125.
Managbanag 58
second feature is corollary to the first. Since perceptions are the
basis for Hume's analysis, then all factors not inherent in the
perceptions of history and experience are excluded as evidence. The
result is a method that discounts the supernatural since such matters
are beyond experience. This is the crux of Hume's natural bias as he
approaches the study of religion. He therefore implicitly argues that
premises for religious argument are faulty when they are a priori
assumptions of traditional theology.68 His theory of knowledge has
dictated that the alleged logic and rightness of the traditional
approach should be ignored.^ 9
Hume's conclusions concerning the nature of religion are
inevitable. The origins of religion are found in human nature and not
necessarily in any divinity. "^^ Hume claims that in the final analysis,
religion has its origin not in the contemplation of the world nor in the
acceptance of divine revelation. The origin of religion lies in human
nature's inner fear of the unknown realities of life and existence.^ ^
During Hume's era this was a revolutionary conclusion. From the
experience of perceptions come awareness of the fear and anxiety of
the unknown. Religion is the outcome of human nature's dealings
with this fear and anxiety. As humans confront and experience the
unknown, the tendency is to resort to what is already known in
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Gaskin, p. 144.
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order to comprehend it. The known facets of experience are
allegorized to understand the unknown. The unknown is defined as
those unexplainable phenomena of human existence. Humanity is
epistemologically incapable of comprehending the unseen and the
non-sensible. Such matters are beyond the world of experience and
perceptions. Thus human nature is prompted by an inner drive to
assign manifestations to the unknown and unseen qualities from
certain events and items in the world that humanity experiences.^ ^
Hume expounds this proposal in his account of the rise and evolution
of religion.
The origin of deity comes from the experience of various and
contrary events of life and the works of nature. Primal humanity did
not have the cognitive sophistication to contemplate the pattern and
order of the world as a whole. Particular happenings in human life
stirred up humanity's deepest emotions. There are also certain
phenomena that early humans did not understand. Such deep
emotions led the early humans to project imaginary beings as the
unknown causes of the events and the phenomena. ideas of
perfection were causally inferred from the experience and
perception of imperfections and limitations. Such ideas were
transferred to the idea of deity which was postulated as the cause.
72 Price, p. 126.
73 Hume. p.20.
74 Price, p. 126.
75 Hume, p.20.
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The regularity and order of the universe did not excite primal
humanity's curiosity. For each phenomenon that was unexplainable,
a god was inferred as the causal explanation. The result was
polytheism. Hume insisted that primal humanity was polytheistic.
The early humans were not cognitively and intellectually
sophisticated. Polytheistic religion was their method of
understanding and dealing with the fear and anxiety of the
unknown. This primitive nature was inherent in the fact that the
early humans also ascribed human qualities to their deities. Hume
argues that all known primitive peoples who had any form of
religion are poly theistic. "^^ He insists that had they been monotheistic
they would have been sophisticated enough to understand the design
argument. They would have had a sense to appreciate the universe
as a whole. But instead there was the ancient preoccupation with
particular happenings and events that inevitably lead to
polytheism. 78 if primal humanity had grasped the design argument,
then they would have been able to see the force of monotheism.
Hume considered it inconceivable that having grasped monotheism
the early humans would abandon it for their particularistic
conception of the universe. Therefore the key to Hume's thesis is
76 Op.Cit., pp. 19-20.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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that monotheism is nurtured by an advanced and sophisticated view
of the world (i.e. evident in the design argument).
But since it is shown that early humanity was neither advanced nor
sophisticated, then the monotheistic conception was at that point
unattainable. And polytheism was dominant in religion. In Hume's
view therefore, the rise of monotheism was characteristic of the
increasing advancement and sophistication of humanity. But this
was not a great leap. It was rather a gradual evolutionary process.
In this context Hume contended that monotheism arose not because
of reason but because of humanity's spirit of adulation and flattery.
This was manifested in the adoration and exaltation of one god over
the rest, so that a strong sense of allegiance and submission was
established in the experience of adulation to that one god. It is the
struggle of faithfulness and fidelity to this one god in the face of
other gods that accounts for the instability of monotheism. 8 1 There
was always a constant possibility of regression from theism to
idolatry. 82 The gradual achievement of cognitive advancement and
intellectual speculation gave strength to monotheism. As humanity
increased in rational abilities the unknown became more and more
orderly and whole. Thus the belief in one god evolved into the
highest level of monotheism. There are no other gods but that one
god. This is evident in Hume's comparison and contrast between
80 Hume, p.20.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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polytheism and monotheism. He favored polytheism because it was
more easy-going and tolerant. ^3 Monotheism on the other hand was
exclusive and intolerant much to the distaste of Hume's temperate
personality. But monotheism has one sole advantage. It is more
conformable to sound reason.84 Other than that its rationality is
buried beneath a mass of irrationality, absurdity, superstition, and
controversy. 85 Much more, Hume reasoned that monotheism's
reasonable edge paid a heavy price in that it became habitually
fused with philosophy.86 The result was in Hume's terms, "the absurd
convolutions of scholasticism".87
The bottom line is that whether it be polytheistic or monotheistic,
the nature of religion can be stated in two maxims. (1) Religious
sentiment is only one of the many passions of humanity. 88 As such it
arises out of an inner human fear and anxiety of the unknown. As a
passion it is only secondary and not a primary passion like self-love,
affection, love of progeny, gratitude, resentment, etc. 8 9
83 Ibid.
84 Op.Cit., p.21.
85 Hendry, p.403.
86 Hume. p.21.
87 Ibid.
88 Price, p.26.
89 N^^i,ral Religion, p.21.
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(2) There is no logical relation between a priori principles of religion
and their origins in human nature (i.e. passions).90 What appears to
be rational is the attempt to use reason to logicalize the passions of
human nature. Religion has no more authority than any other
sentiment of human nature. Its affective appeal to the unexplainable
and the supernatural draws an authority missing in the other
passions. 91 Religion as a sentiment exalts what cannot be
comprehended and assumes its origins to be divine.92 Hume's central
claim is that the nature of religion rests in our humanity. It is also
human nature to attempt the understanding of deity, to make it
concrete. 93 It is the effort to make the incomprehensible familiar to
the human intellect. 94 As such religion seeks to base itself in what is
epistemologically impossible.
Conclusion
It is not difficult to see the relationship of Hume's epistemology to
his philosophy of religion. Hume's theory of knowledge is clearly the
foundation for his religious views. Behind his insistent claims
concerning natural and revealed religion, and the nature of religion
itself, lies that sceptical empiricism that holds his philosophy
90 Price, p. 126.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Donald Siebert, "Hume on Idolatry and Incarnation", Journal of the Historv of
Ideas (v.45. no.3, July-Sept. 1984), p.379.
94 Ibid.
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together. Hume's concern with religion stems from his
epistemological concerns. In his view, religious claims for theism
have gone beyond the limits of human nature. In this respect Hume
is one with the sceptical tradition of Hobbes and his criticism of
religious thought. But Hume clearly does not subscribe to the natural
materialism of Hobbes. Hume's empiricism entails a metaphysical
scepticism that Hobbes is not willing to concede. Hobbes' scepticism
was directed towards the metaphysical speculations of religion and
not his own speculations. Hume in his theory of knowledge is
determined to be sceptical of all metaphysical dogma even that of
the empiricist and naturalist tradition itself. His rejection of
metaphysical thinking is probably the main feature of his philosophy
of religion. Hume's real objection against religion is that it is
essentially based upon faith.95 in his criticisms of natural and
revealed religion, Hume demonstrates why religion cannot be based
on reason or experience. Appeals to rational argument are faulty
because they have no ultimacy in human experience. Appeals to
empirical arguments are inconclusive because they should be
ultimately limited to experience and should not go beyond it. Hume
claims that religion essentially comes from within human nature
itself. It arises from human passions and sentiments. The primacy
of experience shows: the weakness of rational argument, the
limitations of empirical propositions, and the perception of human
nature. These results of empirical analysis are the features of
Hume's philosophy of religion.
95 Ibid.
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Hume's final verdict about religion encapsulates the repercussions
of his theory of knowledge. The fact that faith is the only essential
ground for religion communicates the total meaning of Hume's
philosophy of religion. There is no reasonable argument for theism
that is valid without experience. Thus a priori arguments and
arguments from design cannot succeed. Empirical arguments have
no conclusive evidence in experience. Thus such arguments are
based on a faith that goes beyond perceptions. And arguments from
history and experience itself show that religion springs from human
nature. Faith is an innate feature of humanness. It is a passion and
sentiment that is bred in the depths of the human soul. Hume's
epistemological account of faith and belief illumines this religious
conclusion. Judgments and propositions of belief involve a simple or
a complex idea.96 The idea or ideas rise from impressions of
experienced perceptions and are thus no different from any other
idea of imagination (pp. 19-20). The feature that distinguishes ideas
of belief from other ideas of imagination is not the ideas themselves
but rather the force, feeling, and vivacity that accompanies the
ideas. 97 The firmness and steadiness of the feeling and force that
come with the ideas defines the nature of faith and belief.98 Faith
therefore is a powerful affection that is evoked by a particular idea
or ideas associated with impressions.99 As such, faith and belief is a
96 McNabb, p.70.
97 Op.Cit., p.72.
98 Op.Cit., p.81.
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human passion and sentiment. The implication is clear. Since
religion is a matter of faith, then it is an issue of human passion
embedded deep in human nature.
99 Ibid.
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Chapter Four
Dialogues: The Epistemological Synthesis
The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is the finest display of
Hume's philosophy of religion. It can easily be noticed that Hume
dealt more seriously with natural religion because it was the more
popular religious issue of his day. The spread of Deism which was
energized by continental rationalism contended that religion is
inherent to the rational mind. It is discovered and understood
through reason alone. This movement was also paralleled by the
increasing voices of British thinkers who disagreed with the
rationalist position in favor of empiricism. The empirical version of
natural religion argued that religion can only be reasonable when it
is grounded in experience. It is validated by the experimental
method. The dialectic between the two polar positions defined the
climate of religious discussion in Hume's day. The standpoints of the
two lines of reasoning clearly marks the fundamental clash between
rationalistic and empiricist epistemologies. Hume was inevitably
drawn to this debate not only because of his interest in religion, but
also because of his epistemological commitments. As mentioned
previously, Hume's main contention with religion is its flagrant
disregard of the limits of human understanding. Hume then engages
in the subject of natural religion primarily from this epistemological
compulsion. Hume's dealings with natural religion exemplifies his
philosophy of religion because it is in that subject that Hume's era
was at a religious crisis point. And since Hume's approach to religion
is fundamentally epistemological, it would come as no surprise if his
theory of knowledge is synthesized in his philosophy of religion. The
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crux of natural religion is expressed in the conviction that theism is
accessible to reason. The disagreement was whether reason is of a
rationalistic or an empirical nature.
As previously noted, Hume considered the empirical nature of
reason more serious than the rationalistic one. His empirical bias
compelled him to consider the experimental arguments for theism
over the a priori arguments. Nevertheless it would be misleading to
conclude that Hume came down supporting the empiricist side of the
debate. Hume's sceptical empiricism spelled out the anemic nature
of both rationalism and empiricism. This fundamental stance in his
epistemology synthetically undergirds his philosophy of religion.
These features are inevitably traceable in the Dialogues. In this
literary masterpiece one will discover the raging issues in natural
theology during Hume's day. In the same work one will also
perceive how Hume was more intrigued by the empirical reasoning
in theistic arguments. Most of the dialogues concentrate on the
empirical argument from order and design. And the synthesis of
Hume's sceptical empiricism becomes apparent as he deals with
reason in natural religion. The Dialogues will demonstrate in its
philosophy of religion, the full consequences of Hume's epistemology
for both rationalism and empiricism.
Synopsis
The Dialogues have always been enigmatic for Hume scholars
primarily because efforts have been made to decide which character
personifies Hume. There are five characters in the Dialogues:
Cleanthes the religious empiricist, Pamphilus the pupil of Cleanthes,
Hermippus the friend of Pamphilus, Demea the pious Orthodox, and
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Philo the sceptic. 1 The dialogues revolve around Cleanthes, Demea,
and Philo. The problem as to which character is representative of
Hume will not be dealt with in this paper. The widely accepted view
is that of N.K. Smith. 2 Philo is primarily the Humean spokesperson
though the other main characters also speak for Hume. Another
prominent view is that espoused by Hendel. 3 Pamphilus is Hume and
the main characters are various conflicts within Hume that seek to
inform him. The most productive approach to this problem can be
avoided if all of the characters are understood to represent Hume's
thoughts. All arguments must be ascribed to Hume as a literary and
philosophical production. As a literary work there is no particular
character that solely represents Hume. It is only in this sense that
Bricke is acceptable in his espousal of Hume's literary objectives.^
But it is not true that the philosophical content takes a backseat to
Hume's literary interests. The Dialogues as a whole represents the
intricacies of Hume's philosophy of religion. Therefore all the
characters working together are Hume. But if the Dialogues was
written in sensitivity to the religious and intellectual environment of
its time, then it is not inappropriate to relate certain historical
figures to some of Hume's characters. ^ But these ascriptions should
1 James Rurak, "Hume's Dialogues as a Drama: Some Implications for the for the
argument from Design", Perkins Journal (v.34. Summer 1981), p. 17.
2 John Bricke, "On the Interpretation of Hume's Dialogues", Religious Studies (v. 11,
March 1975), p.2.
3 Op. Cit., p.3.
4 Ibid.
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not be taken to be strict and total but rather arbitrary and
discriminate. There are points when Hume makes some of his
characters speak for certain personalities of his period. With these in
mind we can now approach a certain synopsis of the Dialogues.
Hume modelled this masterpiece upon Cicero's The Nature of the
Gods. He follows the format of Cicero's dialogues so that his work
reflects parallel features with Cicero. ^ Like Cicero, Hume restricts the
arguments to the nature of God.^ Hume also uses the device of a
narrator who introduces the dialogues and concludes them with a
summary evaluation of what he takes to be the upshot of the
discussion. 8 Pamphilus is the narrator of the dialogues. As a pupil of
Cleanthes he witnesses the discussions of Cleanthes, Demea, and
Philo. He recounts the dialogues to his friend Hermippus who seems
to have a critical interest in the content and views of the discussions
between Cleanthes and company. ^ It is appropriate in this respect to
see the point of Hendel's representation of Hume in Pamphilus.
Pamphilus speaks for Hume as he explains the choice of the dialogue
format to present the various issues of natural religion. lO Hermippus
5 R.J.S. Manning, "David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: Otherness in
History and Text", Religious Studies (v.26, Sept. 1990), p.426.
6 Henry Aiken, ed. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Hofner,
1948), pp.xii-xiii.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Richard Popkin, ed. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1982), pp.1-2.
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can be seen to represent Hume's readers: the common people who
"favor philosophical theology over playful skepticism." ^ i
The Dialogues begins with Pamphilus expounding how the
dialogue format is well suited for the subject of the existence and the
nature of God.^^ Rurak's synopsis of the rest of the Dialogues
proceeds as follows:
After the scene is set by Pamphilus, Cleanthes and Philo
dispute the nature of theology. Cleanthes succeeds in
establishing that natural theology is a science firmly
rooted in common sense. He is then tempted by his own
ambition to extend his victory in an effort to refute
Demea's claim that the nature of God cannot be known
by reason. Cleanthes falls a victim to Philo, and loses
his case, yet he is saved by adopting a modified form of
skepticism. The hero, though vanquished, is triumphant
because as a reasoner he has yielded to the force of
reason even when painful to do soA^
Pamphilus closes the dialogues by concluding that Philo's views were
more probable than Demea's but Cleanthes was closer to the truth. i^
In Part I of the Dialogues Cleanthes establishes the experimental
validity of religion as empirical and equal to science. From Parts II
to IV Cleanthes attempts to show that the nature of God can be
ascertained by empirical argument and reasoning. He is then refuted
10 Jeffrey Wieland, "Pamphilus in Hume's Dialogues", The Journal of Religion (v.65,
no.l, Jan.1985), p.35.
11 Op.Cit., p.36.
12 Rurak, p. 18.
13 Op.Cit., p. 17.
14 Popkin, p.89.
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convincingly by Philo in Parts V to XI. And in the final Part XII
Cleanthes, in his noble acquiescence to Philo's reasoning, is declared
the hero. The various facets and features of these dialogues induce
certain observations about Hume's philosophy of religion. They show
the operation and relation of proper and valid argument as it is used
to establish theism. For the most part, the dialogues explore the
theistic claims that purport to be the based upon empirical and
experimental methods of reasoning.This is the essence of the
discussions concerning the design argument. Then there is quite a
marginal portion relegated to the relevance of a priori arguments
based on rationalistic principles. A more significant section delves
extensively into the experimental arguments concerning theistic
claims in the face of the empirical realities of evil. The conclusion of
the dialogues expresses Hume's final word about the whole process
of reasoning as it is used to justify religious claims. Ironically, this
finality also demonstrates synthetically the ends of Hume's sceptical
empiricism as epistemological philosophy.
The Design Argument
It can be definitely pointed out that as a whole, the Dialogues deal
with the argument from design. In Hume's thought this argument is
the essence of natural religion. The attempt to reason for the
existence of God has an eventual recourse to the design argument. In
the eighteenth century this argument was ultimately expressed in
both rational and empirical terms. But in Hume's philosophy of
religion both reasonings are dealt with in full force. The Humean
approach to natural religion is presented in the intensive analysis of
the design argument in both its rationalistic and empiricist
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foundations. In the Dialogues. Hume's basic contention is evident.
The argument from design provides no basis for any claim to
religious knowledge. In a general sense Hume assumes that the
heart of the design argument is the epistemological relation of
causation. The majority of the dialogues attend extensively to the
empiricist view of causation that causes can be inferred from
experienced effects. This is the basis on which Philo attacks the
design argument and its expressions in the theodicy issue. The
rationalistic view of the causal relation claims that certain effects by
virtue of their existence necessitate a rational cause. Both lines of
reasoning are rejected in the final analysis. But this is the first
indication of Hume's epistemological synthesis in the Dialogues. The
reasoning behind the deportments of natural religion have no
potency when probed by Hume's theory of knowledge.
The Dialogues does not immediately begin with the design
argument but rather builds up towards it. The basic subject first laid
out pertains to the nature of God: his attributes, decrees, and his plan
of providence. "These have always been subjected to the
disputations of men: concerning these, human reason has not reached
any certain determination." 16 Pamphilus has set the parameters of
natural religion as the determination of the nature of Deity (not its
existence). It is interesting that the actual dialogues begin with the
essential character of religious claims. From the discussions
concerning the education of Pamphilus, the issue emerges as to
15 Op.Cit., p.4
16 Ibid.
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whether religion should be the fortress of certainty or the extension
of ideas and principles implicit in everyday knowledge. Demea opts
for the first because he is convinced that Divine nature is far beyond
humans. Thus religious claims are powered by a certainty that is
beyond everyday knowledge. Demea is supported by Philo. The
sceptic at once brings in the potency of sceptical thought as the most
reasonable assumption. Cleanthes however is the religious empiricist
and he insists that religious claims are of such a nature that they are
essentially implicit in common sense. He potently demonstrates that
religious claims must be equal to those of science. They must be
firmly rooted in the experimental method. His convincing contention
is that religious claims cannot be grounded in scepticism because a
sceptical philosophy is impossible to live by even for the sceptic
himself. To this Philo relents but he emphasizes that scepticism
leads to a reflective consciousness that fosters proper care and
caution in making religious claims based on experience. In these
deliberations Hume has laid out the ground rules for the design
argument. As a religious claim it must be grounded on experience so
that the argument's strength is contained in the empirical. Philo's
attempt to engage the empirical nature of religious claims as based
upon empirical reasoning is refuted by Cleanthes. If religious claims
for theism are grounded in experience and made accessible to
experimental analysis, then scepticism is diminished to the role of
facilitating honest inquiry. 1 8 The epistemological undercurrent is
17 Rurak, p. 18.
18 Op.Cit., p. 19.
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clear. Hume's sceptical empiricism allows that natural religion has an
empirical foundation. This means that any theistic claim must be
strictly true and evident in the empirical world. With this the stage
is set. Now it remains to be seen whether the design argument can
meet the empiricist challenge.
Demea stubbornly refuses to accept Cleanthes' assertion about the
empirical essence of religious claims. He contends that no amount of
empirical reasoning can establish the nature of Deity because
divinity is beyond experience. Here Cleanthes attempts a daring
move. He will try to show the pious Orthodox believer that empirical
reasoning can demonstrate the nature of God without being
vulnerable to Philo's sceptical claws. The result is the much
celebrated argument from design.
Look around the world: Contemplate the whole and
every part of it: You will find to be nothing but one
great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of
lesser machines which again admit of subdivisions to a
degree beyond what human senses and faculties can
trace and explain. All these various machines, even
their most minute parts, are well adjusted to each other
with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all
men who have contemplated them. The curious
adopting of means to ends, throughout all nature,
resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the
productions of human contrivance; of human design,
thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all
the rules of analogy that the causes also resemble, and
that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the
mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties,
proportioned to the work which he has executed. By
this argument a posteriori and by this argument alone.
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do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his
similarity to human mind and intelligence. ^ 9
In these words Hume has put in the mouth of Cleanthes the empirical
argument for theism expounded by British empiricism. In Cleanthes'
argument we hear Butler and Berkeley pushing for the legitimacy of
this reasoning from design. It is no wonder then that Demea, who
stands for the Orthodox position steeped in rationalism, is incensed.
What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No
abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! 20
Philo then tries his hand and objects to the argument on three
counts. 21 (1) Reasoning about relations between certain parts is no
guarantee that the relation of the parts to the whole is of the same
kind. (2) What can be observed as a rule for one part of nature
cannot be taken as a rule for other parts. (3) And the constant
conjunction among events may serve as a just means of reasoning
about observed sequences but it cannot be applied to the universe as
a whole. We cannot observe, or experience the origin of the
worlds. 22 Philo's challenge is pointed to the fact that Cleanthes'
argument does not rest totally on experience. Cleanthes once again
delivers an effective rebuttal. If Philo's objections are valid then the
Copernican theory of distinctions between terrestrial and celestrial
19 Popkin, p. 15.
20 Ibid.
21 Rurak, p.20.
22 Ibid.
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matter is unacceptable. ^3 In fact the gamut of astronomy might as
well be discarded. Philo is stunned. The backlash implies a stunning
defense for religious claims. Cleanthes has shown that the design
argument is faithful to its empirical parameters. Hume's
epistemology again surfaces. Arguments of strength must be
founded upon experience and the experimental method. Cleanthes is
at his finest moment. He has eluded Philo and has shown Demea that
divine qualities as intelligence and mind can be empirically
established. Cleanthes has demonstrated the similar nature of
religious claims with scientific claims. Philo is silenced because he
does not realize the full strength of Cleanthes' argument. This
reflects Hume's seriousness with regards to the design argument. As
a theistic claim, this empirical argument purports to be faithful to
Hume's epistemological prescriptions. The causal relation the
argument bases itself on is experimentally accessible. The fact that
the design argument also had its supporters in scientists like Newton
himself was no insignificant thing. ^4 From this point Philo takes a
more defensive posture in that he engages Cleanthes in a battle for
lost ground. After that stunning moment he gradually seeks to
recover from the unexpected blow that Cleanthes has dealt him.
But once again it is Demea who covers Philo's retreat. Demea
challenges Cleanthes to show why the design argument is not mere
anthropomorphism. 25 The claim that Deity has an intelligent and
23 Ibid.
24 Popkin, pp.x-xi.
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mental quality springs from comparisons with human nature. His
criticism is that the argument imposes the depths of humanness in
its intelligence and mind to the inference of a divine cause.
Cleanthes is charged with reasoning from human nature to the
beyond. Demea reasserts that God's nature is beyond any human
quality and action. Here is the instance when Hume's epistemology
comes out of Demea's mouth. Hume begins the dismantling of the
design argument not in its causal features but in its analogical
dimension. The issue now is not that of cause and effect but that of
the analogical feature of the argument. Can an analogy be applied
between humanity and deity? Cleanthes' response marks the
beginning of the onslaught that culminates in the destruction of the
design argument.
A mind, whose acts and sentiments are not distinct and
successive, one that is wholly simple and totally
immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason,
no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or in a word, is
no mind at all.26
Cleanthes dilemma is evident. He will have to demonstrate how
observations from nature can be extended by analogy to the
conclusion that nature itself is the work of a divine mind. He is
dared to show from experience alone the attributes of Deity.
Cleanthes extended the empirically evident attributes of human
nature to the very nature of God. It is this epistemological analogy
25 Rurak, p.21.
26 Popkin, p.29.
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that gives Philo the opportunity for a comeback. Philo poses three
questions that coaxes Cleanthes out of his empirical parameters.27 (i)
How can God's infinite perfections be supported by evidences from a
finite universe? (2) Even if the universe did display qualities of
order and design, how does it support the inference of an adroit
designer? The universe may also be the final product of one among
many abortive attempts at creation. (3) Even if the universe is
conceived as a unity, what is the evidence that it has come from a
single cause? It could be the result of a collaboration of many
creators. Cleanthes' assertions that the nature of God can be
established through experimental reasoning is now taken to task.
The design argument is made to justify its analogy through empirical
argument. Philo chides Cleanthes by claiming that experience is
insufficient basis for establishing an analogy between the Divine and
the human. This analogical relation is an extension that violates the
supposed ground rules that had been laid out for religion in the
outset. By insisting that religious claims about the nature of God can
be empirically established, Cleanthes has lured himself out of the
experimental world that he had earlier grounded religion on. In
order to justify the analogical dimension of the design argument he
went beyond the parameters of empirical reasoning. Thus he falls
prey to Philo's sceptical charges. He is unable to refute the
alternative arguments to his position because like the analogy of the
design argument, the alternatives are also extensions beyond the
domain of experience. Without the strength of the experimental
27 Rurak, pp.2 1-22.
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method Cleanthes' empirical argument cannot stem the penetrating
advances of Philo's scepticism. The implication is striking. Hume's
epistemology has laid a trap for the theistic claims. Hume has given
the condition that religion is reasonable when its theistic claims are
grounded on experimental reasoning. The more theistic claims
depart from this empirical foundation, the deeper they enter into the
world of scepticism. This is evident in Philo's cutting statements.
... a man who follows your (Cleanthes) hypothesis is able
perhaps to assert or conjecture that the universe
sometime arose from something like design. But
beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single
circumstance and is left afterwards to fix every point of
his theology by the utmost license of fancy and
hypothesis. 28
Cleanthes refuses to accept Philo's intimations of his position. But he
is able only to respond in steadfast adherence to his argument. The
"hypothesis of design in the universe" is a "sufficient foundation for
religion". 29
It is at this point that Philo comes back with more confidence.
Cleanthes has been lured out of the security of experience and
common sense. His religious claims are now vulnerable to intensive
sceptical analysis. Philo now attempts to undermine the "hypothesis
of design" that Cleanthes has devotedly maintained. Philo presents
an alternative to the analogical feature of the design argument: the
animal analogy. He proposes that the universe is closer by analogy
28 Popkin, p.37.
29 Op.Cit., p.38.
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to an animal than a machine. By using the same line of argument
presented by Cleanthes for design, Philo reasons for the equal
plausibility of the universe as an animal. Now Cleanthes is in serious
difficulty. He is unable to use the design argument in refuting the
animal analogy. After a few thoughtful moments he opts for
responding to Philo by showing that the universe is rather more like
a vegetable than an animal. Here Cleanthes has spelled out his
demise. He has already been coaxed out of the empirical parameters
that he has claimed for religion. He now engages in the sceptic's
game matching hypothesis to hypothesis and theory to theory.
Cleanthes gets so carried away in the heat of the discussion that he
presents a revised view of the universe in his responses to Demea
and Philo. 30 Philo challenges Cleanthes to produce evidence for this
view that makes it more valid than other views. It is clear that
Cleanthes
is caught in the Sceptic's trap. Now Philo is prepared to deliver the
blow to the design argument. Hume's epistemology has again
ingeniously fielded a major point against natural religion. The
epistemological undercurrent of Cleanthes' dilemma makes a
statement about religion. As Rurak puts it: "religion here begins to
appear as one of those subjects that run wide of common life". 3 1
Religious claims when unravelled are bold speculations that have no
reasonable justification in experience. Thus as purely metaphysical.
30 Op.Cit., p.42.
31 Rurak, p.22.
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such theistic maxims are beyond reason and are therefore rightfully
prone to scepticism's searing attack.
It is evident that Philo has called the analogical dimension of the
design argument into serious question. Now he proceeds to
dismantle the other dimension of the argument: causation. Philo
contends that the machine analogy pales in comparison to the
vegetable or animal analogy. Thus if a cause should be inferred, it
would be that of generation or vegetation. He draws certain
conclusions based on this inference and is interrupted by Demea.
The pious Orthodox believer apparently unsettled by Philo's
contentions, challenges the sceptic to support his case with hard
evidence. Philo's point hits home. Such inferences are virtually
impossible to prove empirically and are therefore of no real
substance. Philo triumphantly illustrates the difficulties that the
design argument is faced with. The effort to establish that there is a
cosmic order in the universe is forced to deal with two points. ^2 (i)
Even if there is enough data to infer a cause of the universe it is not
enough to support the conclusion that the cause is an intelligent
mind. The conclusion of a generative or vegetable principle as causal
explanation is just as plausible as that of a cosmic mind. One
judgment of sufficiency is initially as good as any other.33 (2) The
conclusion of seeing nature as a vegetable or an animal does not lead
empirically to the inference of a rational and purposive mind as
ultimate cause. Here Philo comes close to expounding the theory of
32 Op.Cit., pp.23-24.
33 Ibid.
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natural selection as an ultimate cause. Cleanthes then criticizes
Philo's alternative causal explanation of the vegetable and animal
nature of the universe. He points out the various difficulties of the
naturalistic theory and challenges Philo to respond to these
difficulties. Philo cannot and he at once turns the tables on
Cleanthes. He accepts the difficulties and claims that they
demonstrate the futility of any cosmic theory including the design
argument. Philo does not make the mistake of claiming a particular
argument as the correct one.34 His point is that there can always be
an alternative argument. 35 He thus declares the resounding strength
of scepticism. "A total suspense of judgment is here our only
resource. "36 It is not difficult here to perceive reverberations of
Hume's theory of knowledge. A postulated cause, be it by analogy or
any means, of an empirically accessible effect must also subscribe to
that same empirical accessibility. The fact that the theistic postulate
of a divine cause is not empirically accessible demonstrates a serious
flaw in the argument from design. Whatever is not inherent and
evident in experience is legitimately accorded doubt and uncertainty.
Empirical reasoning cannot establish theism on the grounds of the
experience of the universe. The nature of God is therefore
inaccessible by any empirical argument. Thus there is no empirical
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Popkin, p.53.
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content to natural religion. This conclusion is evidently the working
of Humean epistemology in the mouth of Philo.
The A Priori Argument
With the design argument's potency reduced to a metaphysically
meaningless issue, the Dialogues then turns to the rationalistic
argument for religious claims. After the major challenge of the
empirical argument for theism has been waylaid, Hume then makes a
quick detour to consider the a priori argument. It is of great
significance that Hume only devotes a few pages of the Dialogues to
this attempt at establishing theism on rational grounds. It can never
be overemphasized that Hume's more serious concern with religion
was its claims to experience. But now in the Dialogues Hume has
diminished the empirical argument from design. It is quite
inevitable then that the minor challenge of the a priori argument is
quickly taken cared of. For Hume the seriousness of rational
arguments for religious claims is minimal compared to the empirical
arguments. As explicated in the previous chapter, Hume's sceptical
empiricism in its epistemological tenets enables the clear
demonstration of the ineffectiveness of rational argument. But in the
subject of natural religion a specific form of the a priori argument
takes shape. It is the same argument that was used in eighteenth
century Britain to combat the rising naturalistic materialism of early
science. Since the Dialogues does reflect the religious dialectic of its
time, it is appropriate that Hume afforded attention to the rational
argument in natural religion. It is quite interesting that Demea is the
character that brings up the issue. He is the Orthodox representative
and it is incumbent upon him to strike a blow for the a priori
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argument. Christian Orthodoxy in Britain had been thoroughly
steeped in rationalism. Thus it is quite natural that its Orthodox
exponent in the Dialogues finds occasion to proclaim it. Philo and
Demea have allied themselves against Cleanthes. Both the Orthodox
and the sceptic denied the empirical accessibility of Deity through
human reasoning. Now that the empiricist Cleanthes is refuted,
Demea seizes the chance to present the rationalistic alternative: the a
priori argument. This is the only major argument that Demea ever
proposes in the Dialogues. And it is the rationalistic argument for
theism. When it becomes clear that the empirical dimension of
reason is unable to establish religious claims, Demea speaks.
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its
existence; it being absolutely impossible for anything to
produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In
mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must
go on tracing an infinite succession without any cause at
all, or must have recourse to some ultimate cause that
is, necessarily existent... We must therefore have
recourse to a necessarily existent Being who carries the
reason of its existence in himself, who cannot be
supposed not to exist... There is consequently such a
Being- that is, there is Deity. 3 7
This argument is a paraphrase of Clarke's lengthy argument in the
first of his Boyle Lectures in 1704.^8 It begins with the operation of
cause and effect which is absorbed into the ontological argument.39
37 Op.Cit., pp.54-55.
38 Gaskin, p.59.
39 Ibid.
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The inference of a cause is of such a rational principle that its non
existence would be self contradictory ."^0 It is of great interest here
that it is Cleanthes and not Philo who actually refutes the argument.
Once again Hume's epistemology is sighted. The empirical Cleanthes
has Hume's blessing to speak against Orthodoxy's entrenched
rationalism. As an empiricist Hume joins Berkeley and Butler in
denying the sting of the ontological argument. Only in Cleanthes,
Hume speaks for the empirical tradition. Hume is an empiricist first
and a sceptic second when it comes to the tension between
rationalism and empiricism.
In Humean fashion Cleanthes picks apart the a priori argument.
Demea's reasoning involves two basic premises. (1) A necessary
being's existence is demonstrable. (2) That being's existence is
sufficient cause for the universe. Cleanthes objects that it is "absurd
to demonstrate a matter of fact by a priori argument". Such facts
are empirical and their contraries can be conceived. Therefore any
being in actuality can be conceived to exist and not to exist without
contradiction. "Consequently there is no Being whose existence is
demonstrable" a priori. And if the non-existence of a first cause
does not necessitate a logical contradiction then a sufficient cause is
not necessarily demonstrated.43 And Philo caps it off by declaring
40 Ibid.
41 Op.Cit., p.60.
42 Ibid.
43 Rurak, p.25.
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the a priori argument as non-convincing and thus it has no appeal to
any reasoning for theistic claims in natural religion. In such quick
moves the a priori argument is put to rest. The interesting part is
that Demea does not argue the point. The matter ends. Moreover,
after being refuted Demea transfers the argument for religious
claims from logic to feelings.'*'* The implications of this short episode
is tremendous. In the eyes of Hume's sceptical empiricism. Christian
Orthodoxy's alliance with rationalism is unarguably a fatal one and is
in all common sense, void of practicality.
The Problem of Evil
Theodicy is the final issue of the Dialogues. Discussion of the
problem of evil in the dialogues between Hume's characters cannot
be considered apart from the issues already discussed. There is no
separate area wherein theodicy is considered without involving the
whole of natural religion. The problem of evil is the climactic scene
where the design argument is dealt its fatal blow. By appealing to
the primacy of experience in religious claims, Cleanthes forced Philo
to contain his scepticism. And again he kept the sceptic at bay when
he reiterated the equal strength of the design argument with
scientific statements. But Cleanthes overreached in his assertions.
He ventured out of the realm of the experimental into the
speculative. There he falls prey to Philo's resurgence and the design
argument receives a series of critical assaults. It is in the subject of
theodicy however that Cleanthes is finally silenced. The design
argument is completely put to rest. With the problem of evil Philo
44 Ibid.
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turns to the offensive. In his arguments on evil, the earlier
embarrassment and its resulting caution now turns into a daring
advance. The design argument has been shown to be wide of its
purported empirical grounds. Now scepticism is in full steam.
Interestingly, it is also on the problem of evil that Demea is
eliminated. The pious Orthodox believer walks out in the end of the
discussion on theodicy. The subterranean movement of Hume's
epistemology surfaces at this point in its fulness. In the subject of
evil Hume believes that he has demonstrated the ultimate triumph of
sceptical empiricism over rationalism and empiricism in natural
religion. When natural religion involves the question of misery and
suffering, the pious Orthodox and the religious empiricist are
trampled beneath the sceptic. The nature and limitation of human
knowledge is made evident in a way that only the sceptic's point of
view is sensible. This is the heart of Hume's brilliance as a
philosopher of religion. The sceptical empiricist has shown that the
religious rationalist and the religious empiricist have no claims to
reason.
With the a priori argument convincingly discounted, the
rationalist is compelled to appeap to the affective dimensions of
religion. Demea thus does not insist upon logic but indulges in an
exposition of human pain and misery as the gateway to religion.
Each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within
his own breast; and from a consciousness of his
imbecility and misery rather than any reasoning, is led
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to seek protection from the Being; on whom he and all
nature is dependent.'* ^
The scenario is set. Both Cleanthes and Demea are refuted. In one
stroke of genius, Hume is now ready to engage in the dismantling of
natural religion itself. Again it is Demea who opens up the discussion
which soon enough turns into an issue of theodicy. He is joined by
Philo in the gloomy litany of human woe.'*^ It appears that both
characters are still in one accord. Both have agreed upon the
absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine nature. Now they agree
on the reality of pain and suffering. The discussion begins to
gravitate towards an explicit issue of evil when Cleanthes joins in.
He disagrees with Philo and Demea in that there is no such misery.
Their litany is a blatant exaggeration. Philo then takes the occasion
to once more pick on Cleanthes' conviction about order, design, and
theism. He challenges Cleanthes to demonstrate from experience, his
view on God's benevolent nature and on the purpose and intent of
the universe. Here Cleanthes realizes that Philo's alliance with
Demea was for the express purpose of refuting him. But Demea does
not perceive this. He urges Cleanthes to see that Philo's challenge has
already been answered by church tradition. The reality of evil and
suffering will be "rectified in other regions and in some future period
of existence (i.e. eternity)".'*'7 Cleanthes objects to this and argues that
resorting to some future state or to other unknown regions are
45 Popkin, p.58.
46 Rurak, p.25.
47 Popkin, p.64.
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arbitrary suppositions. They are not evident nor supportable in
matters of fact. Thus the empiricist echoes Hume's essay on
providence and a future state in the Enquiry. Cleanthes concludes
that the nature of God can and must be determined on the basis of
empirical reasoning. God's benevolent nature can be demonstrated
empirically in nature and that good is more the character of the
universe. In one smart move Hume has set up both Cleanthes and
Demea for the kill. Demea's approach to evil is to vindicate God's
benevolent nature in a future state beyond present realities. This is
handily quelched by the empirical Cleanthes who reminds the
religious rationalist that there is no basis for such a supposition in
experience. But Cleanthes does not realize that by advocating Divine
goodness and by denying the potency of evil in experience, he has
set himself up for Philo's fatal criticism. Philo allows that the reality
of evil can be "compatible with infinite power and goodness in the
Deity ".^^8 But given this compatibility, Cleanthes is now challenged to
prove it in the only valid grounds for reasoning: experience.
Cleanthes has clearly become a victim of the sceptic. He cannot deny
that evil and suffering are as real in the empirical world as good and
happiness. He has to show from these empirical realities that God is
infinitely good and powerful. Cleanthes gambles by bringing the
discussion into a purely theoretical level. He is forced to be
consistent with his empiricism. His difficulty is manifest when he
resorts to a speculative theory. The existence of moral and natural
48 Op.Cit., p.66.
49 Rurak, p.26.
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evil is the work of a finitely perfect being whose level of finite
perfection is far beyond humanity. The universe is the work of this
being and its imperfections are the marks of this being's finiteness.
Philo has the upper hand. Cleanthes has indulged in speculation and
is consequently at his mercy. Philo posits that nature as it is
experimentally observed does not come up to one's expectation of a
wise and powerful creator. One's limited knowledge and intelligence
might be able to reconcile belief in God with the gravity of evil.50 But
this is not a valid procedure of thinking. One must reason from what
is known to what is unknown. Philo is asking Cleanthes to be faithful
to his empirical parameters. Hume in this manner has set the
problem of evil in an epistemological context. Knowledge of God's
nature must be argued from the empirical world. Theodicy must
proceed by inductive argument from experience. By "experience"
Hume meant the observation and perception of nature as a whole.
The empirical argument for God's nature should be inductively based
on the empirical realities of the universe: its good and evil, its
ecstacy and agony, its happiness and misery. This is crucial because
the argument for God's moral nature that criticizes Hume's
inconsistency in his own principles fails to note this significance. It is
not that God's goodness is inferred from human moral goodness.
Rather, if the universe as a whole is assumed to be God's creation.
50 Ibid.
51 Jerry Walls, "Hume on Divine Amorality", Religious Studies (v.26, 1990), p.258.
52 Op.Cit., p.259.
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then Divine goodness must be inferred from the good and evil
realities of the universe in all its facets: human nature and otherwise.
This is evident when Philo observes that one cannot find in nature
conclusive evidence that supports the argument for an infinitely
perfect and powerful being nor even of a finitely perfect and
powerful one. By using the analogy of the "house of horrors" he
explains that if nature has inherent in it this evil and misery, then
one might suppose that this gloomy reality is essential for the benefit
of nature itself. But the objection still stands that if nature's creator
was wise and powerful, then the universe would have been created
in such a way that evil and suffering is avoided. As Philo himself
asserts in his analogy:
... If the architect had had skill and good intentions, he
might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might
have adjusted the points in such a manner, as would
have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His
ignorance, or even your ignorance of such a plan, will
never convince you of the impossibility of it.5 3
The sceptic continues his penetrating analysis. In Philo's eyes, an
impartial look at nature provides good evidence for drawing a
different conclusion. 54 There are four circumstances that justify the
inherent quality of evil and suffering in the nature of the universe. 5 5
(1) Evil is part of the empirical world in which pains as well as
53 Popkin, pp.68-69.
54 Rurak, p.26.
55 Popkin, pp.69-73.
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pleasures excite creatures to action and makes them vigilant in self-
preservation. (2) Evil as a necessity in nature's self-preservation is
an inherent feature of the general laws that define the character of
the universe. This might be good reason to suppose why God would
not alter such a feature of general laws. But Philo contends that the
alterations would not be more than minimum. As such they could
not upset the entire structure of the universe. (3) Evil is a necessary
element in the distribution of abilities and faculties to every
creature. A creature enjoys the advantage of its inherent ability in
certain areas of life. But the same creature suffers crippling
disadvantages in its lack of ability in other areas of life. (4) And
finally, evil is an essential quality of the workmanship and design of
the universe. Although the universe can be observed to be like a
great machine, it is evident that certain parts of this cosmic machine
produce misery and illness. Such parts though well fitted in nature
are sources of catastrophe and tragedy. Certain aspects of nature
have a special purpose; like the wind and the rain. But they affect
other aspects of nature in malignant ways ; as in floods and
hurricanes. Philo has come full circle. He follows the Humean
dictates of experimental reasoning as emphasized zealously by
Cleanthes. The evidence from the empirical world has pronounced
the verdict concerning the design argument. Philo follows the
manner of Cleanthes' formulation of the design argument and comes
to a crushing conclusion.
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion
of beings, animated and organized, sensible and active!
You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But
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inspect a little more narrowly these living existences,
the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and
destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them
for their own happiness! How contemptible and odious
to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the
idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying
principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without
discernment or parental care, her maimed and aborted
children!56
The demolition of Cleanthes' empirical argument is complete. Philo
uses the empiricist's own analogical procedure. He surmises that the
universe as empirically experienced is not only a great and
magnificent machine. It also a cruel and terrifying one. The sceptic
now turns to the causal consequences of this analogy. If the nature
of the universe as a whole is analogous to its cause then the problem
of evil has dark consequences for religious claims. The inference that
the cause of the universe is infinitely intelligent, powerful, and moral
is called into serious question. By intentionally making the problem
an epistemological issue, Hume is able to undermine the subject of
natural religion itself. All claims to knowledge even when they
involve analogy and causation must have empirical grounds. Any
claim that is wide of experience will never be convincing despite its
causal and analogical arguments because it is without confirmation.
Conversely if any claim of cosmic proportions should be based
empirically, it must be analogically and causally reflective of
experience itself. The argument for God's goodness based upon
human moral nature needs to be reminded of this Humean maxim if
56 Op.Cit., p.74.
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it seeks legitimacy in Humean principles. Hume cannot be proven
implausible in his conclusions about God's nature if his basic premise
is not shown to be so. Hume's conclusion is based upon the totality of
experience and its reflection in analogical and causal inferences.
God's nature by analogy must be inherent in the nature of the
universe as a whole. Conversely the nature of the universe must be
the grounds for postulating the moral nature of God as cause. If this
is accepted then Hume's conclusion is the more plausible one given
his stipulations. Even if God were all powerful and wise and it is
assumed that his purposes are worked out in nature, Hume's position
would still be the better one (again given his stipulations). Once
God's moral nature is analogically and causally inferred from human
moral nature, certain consequences are inevitable (provided Hume's
premise is a given). (1) Morality (i.e. human morality) must be
essentially indicative of the nature of the entire universe. (2) All
features of human moral action and affection must be definitive of
God's moral intentions. If (1) is true then two inevitably conflicting
observations pose a problem. The beautiful and sublime aspects of
nature give credence to the inference that its cause is good. And
such natural aspects were intended by its cause to be so. But also,
the horrid and cruel aspects of nature can give credence to the
inference that its cause is evil. And such naturally insufferable
aspects were intended by its cause to be so. The same tension is also
inevitable if (2) is true. When we feel approval for God's work in
creating this world as he did that we declare him benevolent, then
this is God's desire. But also, when we feel disapproval for God's
work in creating this world as he did that we even judge him vicious,
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then this is also God's desire. The polarity of the conflict and its
common claim on experience makes the support of either side
ridiculous. A case can be empirically supported that God created the
universe to promote creaturely happiness and that he himself
desires such happiness. But a case can also be empirically supported
that God created the universe not for creaturely happiness but
creaturely misery and that he himself desires such misery. The
argument that our moral nature at its best reflects God's own nature
is faulty in Hume's epistemological context for two reasons. (1)
There is no reason why our moral nature at its worst does not also
reflect God's nature since both are empirical realities of human
nature. And (2) it is quite obvious that human moral nature does not
define the character of the universe as a whole. There are other
aspects of the universe that do not lend themselves to a moral
nature. And if human nature reflects the nature of its creator then
the non-moral nature of other aspects of the universe reflect the
nature of their maker. This argument for God's moral nature if it
subscribes to empirical reasoning falls prey to the same analogical
and causal dangers that brought the downfall of the design
argument. Any argument for God's nature that bases itself on
experience becomes victim to the chokehold of the problem of evil.
This is the final point of Philo's criticism of a natural religion that
bases itself upon proper reasoning (that being empirical). Certain
questions underlie Philo's final formulation of the problem of evil for
natural religion. ^ 7 if God does exist then in what cases does his
57 Rurak, p.27.
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nature [author's change] make a difference to the universe as we
experience it? And in those cases where it might make a difference,
why hasn't it? Philo thus sums up the issue of theodicy in "four
hypotheses about about the first causes of the universe".58 (i) That
the causes are endowed with perfect goodness. (2) That the causes
have perfect malice. (3) That the causes have both goodness and
malice. And (4) that the cause have neither goodness and malice.
The fact that the universe as a whole exhibits both good and
malicious phenomena eliminates the first two. The general and
scientific laws of nature seem to discredit the third. (There might be
a possible weakness in Hume's third hypothesis. His elimination of
the third might mean that the natural laws are amoral in which it is
really a subtle form of the fourth. Or that the natural laws are either
not malicious in which case it is a subtle form of the first, or that
such laws are not good in which it is subtle form of the second.)
Philo opted for the fourth hypothesis as the most probable given the
empirical realities of the universe.
The true conclusion is that the original source of all
things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and
has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above
cold; or to drought above moisture, or to light above
heavy. 59
Philo then declares the theological and moral implications of his
amoral conclusion. Human rectitude cannot be analogous to Divine
58 Popkin, p.75.
59 Ibid.
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benevolence. There is no reason to apply such an analogy to the
Supreme Being as the inferred cause of the entire universe. Rather it
is much more reasonable to exclude any moral ascription to such a
being because of the potent implications of the problem of evil.
Hume's analysis of natural religion is complete. The surges of his
theory of knowledge has demonstrated the fact that there is no
foundation for religious claims in reason. Both the a priori and a
posteriori arguments for the nature of God have no validity in the
reasoning process of human knowledge. Therefore the Divine
attributes that are the focus of religious devotion and piety are
meaningless. Phillips observes that Hume's epistemology is evident
in three levels of arguments in the Dialogues. (1) There is no direct
knowledge of God in nature. (2) Nature cannot be regarded as an
artifact because it assumes an epistemological look outside of nature.
(3) There is no intelligibility of postulating God as explanation for the
world's existence. The world is not an object for which it makes
sense to seek a cause. Since there are no grounds for speaking of the
world as an artifact then there is no basis for speaking of a maker of
the world. Cleanthes (and to an extent Demea) was not able to see
the distinction between the rational and the non-rational in the
subject of religion. Religious claims are really irrational in that they
are based upon innate human sentiments. If this is the nature of
religion then it is a confusion to ascribe a foundation for it in reason.
Phillips coins it as a conceptual confusion.6i Philo has attempted to
60 Dewi Phillips, "The Friends of Cleanthes", Modem Theology (y.l, no.2, Jan.
1985), pp.92-93.
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show that Cleanthes' arguments are results of this conceptual
confusion. 62 The bankruptcy of reasoning in religion is manifest in
the problem of evil. The sceptic's conclusion therefore entails nerve-
racking consequences for religion. Since it is impossible to infer the
attributes of God through human reasoning, then there is no point
and meaning in contemplating and considering God's nature. If this
is so, then the very existence of God himself has no significant
meaning. Natural religion is a meaningless subject and is of no
essential significance to religion. It is at this climactic point that
Demea realizes Philo's true colors. He has all the while relied on
Philo in the attempt to refute Cleanthes. The pious Orthodox believer
did not perceive that the sceptic was against him as well. If religious
reasonings have no rational or empirical basis then there is no point
in discussing and legitimizing religious devotion and fervor. Demea's
realization is too late. His hope for affirming the reasonable position
of his claims rested on the a priori argument, the incomprehensibility
of Divine nature, and the strategic reality of finitude and misery.
Having been stripped of all these, the meaningless state of Orthodoxy
became apparent. Thus he has nothing to say and is relegated to
complete silence. It is no surprise that Demea finally leaves. If
religion has no grounds in reason then its foundation is to be
understood in different terms. But in this venture. Orthodoxy with
its dogmatic commitment to rationalistic reasoning has nothing to
61 Op.Cit.. p.l03.
62 Op.Cit., p.93.
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say. Thus Demea makes his exit and the venture is left to the sceptic
and the empiricist.
Philo's Conclnsinn
With Demea gone, the debate about God's nature is put to rest.
Since the standing claim to reason has been eliminated in natural
religion, the issue now shifts gears. The matter about religion and its
claims moves toward an understanding of religion that does not
involve argument. It can be noticed that the dialogue between
Cleanthes and Philo in the closing of the Dialogues does not have the
atmosphere of contention. The focus is not upon reasonable
arguments concerning religious claims. The approach through reason
in religion has already been shut down. Now the discussion attempts
to venture beneath the rational and empirical arguments into the
real sense in which religion has its foundations. It is again another
interesting peek into Hume's epistemology that the final words on
natural religion stem from the sceptic and the empiricist. The
tensions between the fundamental assumptions of Philo and
Cleanthes mirror the operational nature of Hume's theory of
knowledge. Cleanthes' empiricism is urged by Philo to be faithful to
its principles wherever they take him. This is probably the ultimate
issue between the two characters. If the empiricist is to accept
religion then the empiricist must realize that the basis of such an
acceptance is not through any reasoning. It is through this emphasis
that Philo seeks to convince the religious empiricist that the
consistent end of empirical arguments in natural religion is
scepticism. Hume's epistemological dictum deems it necessary that
the end of true empiricism is a sceptical attitude and outlook.
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Philo and Cleanthes now engage in the study of religion behind
its intellectual facade. Here Philo is the dominant speaker. His
monologues show that the sceptic is the empiricist's guide in this
venture. Philo posits that clear definition and sound reasoning can
facilitate the resolution of various disputes.63 He observes however
that disputes about quality can never be resolved by reasoning and
argument. 64 He then surmises that theistic arguments in religion
belong to this kind of dispute. The various arguments for religious
claims concerning God's nature are disputes over quality. The
attributes of Deity can be argued even to a point that, Philo
confesses, makes the argument from design possible. Here the
sceptic seems to have a change of heart as he expounds the viability
of the design argument. But the emphasis resounds that despite this
possibility, religious arguments are still disputes about quality. As
such they are beyond resolution. To this Cleanthes is silent. His
response comes in an assertion of his concerns about religion. He
expresses the conviction that religion is a necessary foundation for
morality. His devotion to this primal function of religion is to the
extent that he is willing to say: "religion however corrupted is still
better than no religion at all".65 Here Philo contends that religion has
always been a major source of intolerance. The implication of course
63 Rurak, p.28.
64 Ibid.
65 Popkin, p.82.
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is that such an attitude is hardly a quality of that which claims to be
a moral foundation. To this Cleanthes replies:
The proper object of religion is to regulate the heart of
men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of
temperance, order, and obedience; and its operation is
silent and only enforces the motives of morality and
justice, it is in danger of being overlooked.66
Notice that the nature of religion is now relegated to a deeper level
far beyond reasonable argument. The sceptic has once again directed
the empiricist. Philo concedes to the deeper fact about religion. But
he still insists that religion plays only a superficial role in affecting
moral conduct. "The smallest grain of natural honesty and
benevolence has more effect on men's conduct than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems. "6 7
Philo is really admonishing that religion ought to be understood in
terms of its concrete effect on moral conduct rather than in terms of
the exalted purposes it describes for itself.^s in this manner Hume
echoes the Natural History in that religion should be viewed as a
phenomenon (i.e. a passion of human nature). This reality of religion
however is epistemologically beyond the justification of reason. The
movement of the Dialogues then begins to deal with the core of Philo
and Cleanthes' venture. If religious claims are not within the scope
66 Ibid.
67 Op.Cit., p.83.
68 Rurak, p.29.
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of reason then they are essentially a matter of faith. The philosopher
might reason to the plausibility of the design argument. But that
argument cannot lead to belief. Religious persons might devote
themselves to the conviction of God's infinite nature. But this does
not necessitate an influence upon philosophical assent nor moral
conduct. Thus in these deliberations the Dialogues echoes the Natural
History. Religion is just like nature. It is inherently deep in human
character. But like nature it cannot furnish human reasoning with
doctrines and morals of meaningful significance.69 The thoughts of
this dialogue finally converge in Philo's conclusion about natural
religion. If the foundation of religion is not in reason then what is
the significance of natural religion? Philo answers:
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to
maintain, revolves itself into one simple, though
somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined, proposition,
"that the cause or causes of order in the universe
probably bear some remote analogy to human
intelligence. .."70
A.G. Vink in his analysis of this conclusion, asserts that the words
probably, some, and remote are Philo's intimations that there is
really no such analogy. 7 1 The one or more internal principles of
order detectable in the universe might have some structural analogy
to human intelligence.72 in Philo Hume was willing to allow the
69 Ibid.
70 Popkin, p.88.
71 A.G. Vink, "Philo's Conclusion in Hume's Dialogues", Religious Studies
(v.25,Dec.l989), p.490.
72 Op.Cit., p.498.
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epistemological integrity of the design argument. But such an
integrity is of no particular significance to the nature of religion.
Philo then closes in distinctly Humean fashion the subject of religion
based on reason. Since natural religion is empty of theological
content, then the religious believer is rightfully driven to the notion
of revelation. It is in revealed religion that the real nature of
religious claims are found. Philo contends that piety and devotion to
religious principles are facilitated by the notion that such principles
are not reasoned but revealed. But such revelations are realized only
by faith. Hence, they are true to the innermost religious sentiments
inherent in human nature. Hume has made the connection between
natural and revealed religion. The former is to be discovered as void
of any reasonable argument. The latter is only legitimized by faith.
Philo thus ends by affirming his scepticism as the surest way in
which a person realizes the futility of reason and is thus brought to
the realm of faith (faith as the true nature of religion). It is the
sceptical onslaught that breaks down the dogmatic adherence to
reason and paves the way for the experience of faith. It is in this
sense that Philo triumphantly declares:
To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the
first and most essential step towards being a sound,
believing Christian. 7 3
In the light of this conclusion Pamphilus closes his narration of the
dialogues. His conclusion on the matter, if Hendel is taken to be
73 Popkin, p.89.
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right, is quite definitive of Hume's views on religion. If Pamphilus
speaks for Hume at this point then the pupil's verdict must be
considered of utmost importance. Philo's principles were declared to
be more probable than Demea's. But Cleanthes' principles were
closer to the truth. The probability of Philo's views over Demea's is
evidently detectable. The pious Orthodox believer was persistent in
his conviction that God's incomprehensible nature was determinable
by rational argument. When it became clear that he was denied this
position, he refuses to continue the discussion. Thus the sceptic's
lethal probe which was supposed to lead one to genuine religion was
refused its claim in Demea. If Demea persists in a religion that is
founded on reason then his views are less probable than Philo's. It is
the sceptic's view that is closer to the real foundation of religion.
Such a view perceives that the vanity of rational argument for
religious claims leads to the realization of true religion. Here Hume
points to the very nature of religion as grounded on innate
sentiments of human nature. It is an issue of human passion that is
envoked in the experience of faith. As such, religion is non-rational
and is consequently unapproachable by reason. It is in this sense
that Philo is more probable than Demea. But Cleanthes' views as
being much closer to the truth is a more difficult verdict to perceive.
If anyone's view is to be lauded as truthful, it should be Philo's. But
instead the final triumph is awarded to the empiricist who was
refuted in his claims. This is the point where the synthesis of Hume's
epistemology becomes the only avenue for understanding Hume's
last words in the Dialogues. His theory of knowledge is synthetically
the underlying current beneath the discussions of the characters. It
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has been brought to attention at certain points when this
subterranean synthesis has manifested itself (at times quite
explicitly). Hume's epistemology holds the answer to the riddle of
Pamphilus' appraisal of Cleanthes. There are two avenues in which
Hume's theory of knowledge unlocks this enigma. Both avenues are
actually connected and inseparable as the two lanes of a highway.
(1) In its historical context the Dialogues involves a battle
between rationalism and empiricism. Hume has joined the fray in
his epistemological writings. In the Treatise and the Enquiry. Hume
has opted to show that empiricism has the upper hand when it comes
to the matter of human understanding. He therefore stands with
Locke and Berkeley in the empiricist tradition. In the Dialogues, this
is clear in the specific instances when rationalistic Demea is refuted
in his arguments. Notice that it is the empiricist Cleanthes who
frustrates every attempt Demea makes in arguing for rational
Orthodoxy. Hence it is the empiricism of Cleanthes that defines
Hume's basic commitment as a philosopher of knowledge over and
against the rationalism of Demea. So that in the end it is the
empiricism of Cleanthes that embodies the epistemological integrity
of knowledge which is definitive of religion.
(2) Given the fact of (1), Philo's role is in relationship to Cleanthes'
empiricism. Although Philo and Demea teamed up in the Dialogues, it
is clear that the real alliance is between Philo and Cleanthes. The
purpose of the sceptic's alliance with the pious Orthodox believer was
to castigate the religious empiricist. Here again Hume's epistemology
comes into play. As emphasized in the second chapter, Humean
empiricism is consistent to the end. And if the empiricist view of
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knowledge is taken to its ultimate consequences then it leads to
scepticism. In Philo, the empiricism of Cleanthes is forced to follow
its epistemological maxims. The sceptic shows that if Cleanthes is
consistent with his empirical commitment then he shall soon realize
that religion has no foundation in reason. If Cleanthes is faithful to
his empiricism, then he will realize that the foundation of religion is
in human nature (i.e. the experience of faith). But without Cleanthes'
empiricism, Philo's scepticism cannot render the realization of true
religion effectual. The philosophical sceptic cannot make the
essential leap to becoming a sound and believing Christian without
the empirical context of the religious empiricist. It is therefore the
empiricism of Cleanthes (purged by Philo's scepticism) that is indeed
closer to the truth.
It is in these terms that Philo's enigmatic acceptance of the design
argument can be understood in its fullest sense. Cleanthes bases the
argument on experience. He asserts fervently that it is only in and
through empirical means that the argument is rendered true. His
mistake was the assumption that such an argument was sufficient
basis for religious claims. This is where Philo corrects him. The real
support behind the design argument is not its rationality but the
compulsion to believe it. The belief in the argument is not based on
reason but on a kind of natural belief. In Hume's epistemology such
a belief is one that human nature is constitutionally prone to hold. ^ 4
Belief in God as laid out by the design argument is analogous to the
74 pheroza Wadia, "Professor Pike on Part Three of Hume's Dialogues", Religious
Studies (v. 14, Sept. 1978), p.326.
Managbanag 108
belief in the existence of external objects.75 The wisdom of
Coleman's estimation of Pamphilus' pronouncements is quite
appropriate. Cleanthes is nearer to the truth because human instinct
inclines one to reason in the way of Cleanthes.76 Philo's objections
are logically sound that its abstruse nature strains the instincts to
appeal to common sense.77 It is only in the corrected position of
Cleanthes' views that Philo's objections become propositions of
substance. Cleanthes' natural theology accords with natural instincts
that it is more apt to public opinion.78 Cleanthes triumphs only
because he is baptized into Hume's epistemological scepticism with
regards to metaphysical speculation. Humean theory of knowledge
puts a high premium on practicality and common sense. Religion is
properly understood only in this practical and common sense level as
it is descriptive of instinct and natural belief. When this is true in
religion then its claims rightly understood are within the limits of
human knowledge. This is why the sceptic concedes to the empiricist
in the end of the Dialogues. The closing statement of Pamphilus'
narration must be read in the light of Hume's remark in his
introduction to the Enquiry:
It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will
always with the generality of mankind, have the
75 Ibid
76 Dorothy Coleman, "Interpreting Hume's Dialogues", Religious Studies (v.25, June.
1989), pp.189-190.
77 Ibid
78 Ibid
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preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by
many will be recommended, not only as agreeable, but
more useful than the other.7 9
79 Ibid
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Chapter Five
Conclusion
The synthesis of Hume's theory of knowledge is undeniably an
underlying feature in Hume's philosophy of religion. This study
began with the assumption that there is an interconnection and
interrelation between the subjects within Hume's philosophy. It was
maintained that an analysis of Hume's thoughts on a certain field can
facilitate the understanding of his views on another. The notion was
established that Hume's philosophy of religion inevitably embodies
the essence of Humean epistemology. The testing ground for this
seminal thought was Hume's timeless classic: the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. The working problem for this thesis
was expressed in a question. How does the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion show the synthesis of Hume's theory of knowledge
in his philosophy of religion? The purpose was clearly to explore this
literary work as the arena in which the connection and relation of
Hume's epistemology with his philosophy of religion can be
discovered. Because of the concentrated nature of this endeavor, the
limits were purposely set exclusively within the subjects of Hume's
theory of knowledge and his philosophy of religion. The entire
activity was intentionally contained in one of Hume's religious
writings: the Dialogues. The hypothesis was that the epistemological
synthesis of Hume's theory of knowledge is discoverable in the
Dialogues. Expectations and notions anticipated the validity of this
hypothesis. It remained therefore to be seen whether this study
would indeed render a validation of such expectations and notions.
But certain things had to be accomplished before the Dialogues was
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subjected to intensive study. A sufficient understanding of Hume's
epistemology and his philosophy of religion needed to be attained
before anything else.
The second chapter therefore delved into the the world of Hume's
epistemological principles as explicated in the Treatise and the
Enquiry. Sceptical empiricism was concluded as the final description
of Humean epistemology. It was a theory of knowledge that refuted
eighteenth century rationalism. But it also brought the true
conclusion of empiricism in its sceptical outlook. The implications of
this sceptical empiricism was pursued in the third chapter's focus on
Hume's philosophy of religion. It was discovered that Hume's main
concern with religion was its conformity to epistemological realities.
His conclusion was that religion has gone beyond the limits of human
understanding. The empirical nature of Hume's theory of knowledge
showed the inability of rational argument to establish theistic claims.
Its sceptical character demonstrated the inconclusive end of
empirical arguments for natural and revealed religion. The
conclusion of Hume's philosophy of religion was that the foundation
of religion is not reason nor experience. The nature of religion is in
the human sentiments within human nature. It was identified that
this conclusion is the coherent end of the sceptical empiricism
characteristic of Humean epistemology.
With the connection and relation established between Hume's
theory of knowledge and his philosophy of religion, the fourth
chapter tested this finding in the Dialogues. As a premier work of
Hume's religious thinking, the Dialogues was expected to express
religious ideas reflective of Humean epistemology. In the dialogues
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between Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo certain Humean principles were
evident. (1) There is no foundation for religion in reason. (2) The
only foundation for religion is faith that originates from the passions
of the human heart. The implications therefore were of utmost
importance. The nature of God and its effect upon human piety,
devotion, and moral conduct are unjustified by any form and method
of reasoning. Such religious maxims cannot be established upon
rationalistic principles. They cannot hold any conclusive claim to be
empirical realities. The only alternative is the experience of faith
that is energized by the deepest sentiments from within. Hume's
sceptical empiricism became evident as the epistemological frame
work of these findings. In the Dialogues. Hume's empiricism broke
down the rationalistic claims of natural religion. His scepticism
castigated empiricism and guided it to its true conclusion: the non-
rational foundation of religion.
Therefore, the synthesis of Hume's epistemology is manifested
clearly in Hume's enquiry into natural religion. He has demonstrated
in the Dialogues that rationalism is refuted in natural theology. And
in the same Dialogues, empiricism is rebuked and directed to its
ultimate end. Hume's sceptical empiricism has indeed claimed that it
is a necessary point of view that leads to the experience of true
religion.
This study therefore can point to certain directions in responding
to Hume. It is no secret that Hume's philosophy is vulnerable and
faulty. But like any legitimate point of view, it has its strengths as
well as its pitfalls. In this exploration of the synthesis of Hume's
epistemology in the Dialogues, certain suggestions can be formulated
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to direct the attempts at challenging Hume. There are two general
directions in which the answer to Hume can be facilitated.
(1) The challenge to Hume must be undertaken from the outside
to the inner sanctum of his theory of knowledge. This is probably
the most effective method of answering Humean philosophy. The
procedure is not to buy into Hume's epistemological assumptions.
The most vulnerable point of Hume's philosophy is his epistemology.
It is very difficult to refute most of Humean arguments especially in
the area of natural religion and morals, if his theory of knowledge is
left in tact. To prove the implausibility of most of any subject in
Humean philosophy, one must first show his epistemological
framework to be implausible. Excellent examples of this can be cited.
Charles Hartshome in his evaluation of western philosophy makes a
critical case of exemplary proportions against Hume's epistemology. ^
Hume makes three basic metaphysical statements in his theory of
knowledge, (a) That no event or thing that is distinguishable from
another can or should be logically dependent or inseparable, (b)
That strict determinism is logically possible, (c) And that nothing can
exist by necessity. Hartshorne cleverly points out that Hume's
combination of (a) and (b) gives him conclusions that are based upon
an irreconcilable union. And at (c) Hume tries to argue that there is
no validity in metaphysical statements. Ironically, by stating (c)
Hume is actually making one. The much older James Orr also
attempts to correct Hume by refusing to accept the plausibility of
1 Charles Hartshome, Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers (Albany: New
York State UP), pp.136-143.
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Hume's epistemological framework. Orr asserts that Hume failed to
solve the problem of knowledge because he excluded rational
presuppositions. 2 By excluding the rational element as key to the
nature of knowledge, Hume made a grievous error. As a result he
ignores the rational self as an inherent nature of humanity. 3 Without
the rational self, Hume has championed a lost cause. The contentions
of Hartshorne and Orr are only a few of the valid (if not successful)
challenges to Hume. Again their effectiveness is in the fact that they
went for the cornerstone of Hume's philosophical edifice. This
approach is evident in the epistemological classic that overshadowed
the Scottish sceptic himself and his brand of empiricism: Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason.
(2) The challenge to Hume can be undertaken at isolated points of
his own views given his epistemological framework. There are
certain Humean arguments that are refutable even when Hume's
principles are allowed. This paper indicates that they are found in
Hume's criticisms of revealed religion in general and of miracles in
particular. It is the opinion of this work that Hume's reasoning
concerning miracles is unsatisfactory even to his own epistemology.
Miracles are realities that fulfil Hume's prescription for valid claims.
The assertions based upon miracles do not go beyond the empirical
parameters of religion. Hume's appeal to the argument of
probability, though not implausible, is unsatisfactory given his
theory of knowledge. His attempt to rest the argument on the
2 Orr, p.vii.
3 Ibid.
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superior probability of natural laws poses certain problems. Both
natural laws and miracles are empirical realities. Both are
established by perceptions. The only advantage awarded to the
probability of natural laws is the extent in which they are
experienced. The former is more public than the latter. Hume can
be accused of two violations, (a) Uncritical acceptance of the
naturalistic testimony to the realities of experience without
convincingly discounting the testimony of miracles to the realities of
the same, (b) Biased definition of miracles in terms of the
probability of natural laws that already discounts miracles in the
outset. These difficulties might very well be Hume's thorn in the
flesh. It demonstrates the fact that Hume might have a stronger case
in natural religion. But he does not have the same fortress in the
subject of miracles and revelation.
It could very well be that the synthesis of Hume's epistemology in
the section "On Miracles" of the Enquiry might yield a contrasting
conclusion for Hume's philosophy of religion. Perhaps it can be found
in that work that there is a foundation for religion in empirical
reality. Such an empirical reality might be experienced that it
evokes the deepest passions of the human heart in the experience
not only of faith but of the actual object of belief itself.
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